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"I believe that the school is primarily a social institution. Education being a social process, the 
school is simply that form of community life in which all those agencies are concentrated that 
will be most effective in bringing the child to share in the inherited resources of the race, and to 
use his own powers for social ends." 
~John Dewey, My Pedagogic Creed, 1897. 

Preface 
American philosopher and educator, John Dewey, is widely regarded as the father of 
modem pragmatism. In the early 201h Century, Dewey expanded the field of philosophy to 
include anthropology, social behavior, and the study of institutions. 1 His understanding of 
philosophy is best captured in the statement: "Philosophy should be considered not as a system 
of curious and idle speculations, but as a practical principle of discipline firmly possessing the 
heart and incessantly exerting itself in the life."2 Now nearly a century later, Dewey's work 
continues to have important implications for how we ought to incorporate philosophy in 
addressing contemporary social issues. Among Dewey's many contributions, his seminal works 
on education and democracy are perhaps his most marked accomplishments. 
This essay follows a similar approach to Dewey's work by applying Elizabeth 
Anderson' s "The Ethical Limitations of the Market" to an analysis of South Africa's education 
system. In constructing a research question, I found philosophy constantly "possessing the 
heart" and "exerting itself in the life" of each interaction and observation that was made during 
my brief month of field research. In the pages that follow, I hope to offer an analysis of 
education and democracy that identifies the utility of philosophic inquiry. I look to encourage a 
problem-solving approach that is less discipline-bound and more apt to include (what I consider) 
important ethical considerations. I argue that this normative .approach to understanding social 
problems can have real and valuable meanings for how we respond to the pressing issues of our 
time. 
, .. 
1 Milton Halsey Thomas and Herbert Wallace Schneider, A Bibliography of John Dewey (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1929), xx. 
2 Ibid. 
'' 
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1 
Abstract: 
Based on the essential role of education in sustaining democracy, policymakers have 
searched for the most equitable and efficient way to provision this important public good. In an 
effort to remedy the injustices of apartheid and Bantu Education, South Africa passed the South 
African School Act of 1996 (SASA), which decentralized education policy and placed control in 
the hands of local communities. But educational decentralization is ripe with contradictions, 
often resulting in a system where genuine decision making remains highly centralized, while only 
" I , , , fiscal responsibilities are delegated to local governments. Like municipal governments in other 
developing nations, local governments in South Africa have relied on the use of market 
mechanisms (viz., user fees) to fund public schools. The goal of this essay is to establish a link 
between South Africa's decentralized market provisioning of education and its effect on the 
social norms that undergird democracy. Through field research at a public school in South 
Durban, I apply Elizabeth Anderson's (2005) "The Ethical Limitations of the Market," in order 
to identify the normative concerns arising from a iocai mafketdistribution of education. I 
conclude that the decentralized education market undermines important social values and that 
democratic processes in the provisioning of education may be required to ensure long term 
sustainability of democratic principles. 
Equal education is one of the most important policy issues in the establishment of a fair, 
democratic society. In Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court observed that 
"Education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments" and held that 
it was a public service that "must be made available to all on equal terms." 1 Since education 
equips young learners with knowledge of what it means to be a citizen, it is an essential good for 
democracy. Education encourages citizens to take oWnership of contemporary social issues, to 
hold government officials accountable, and to engage critically in communal problem solving. 
For these reasons, the state has traditionally assumed primary responsibility in provisioning 
public education. 
But following the centralization of government.power in the 1 ~40s and 1950s, a push for 
decentralization arose from formerly oppressed groups in society. In the 1980s, a second wave 
of decentralization occurred after the fall of authoritarian regimes in Latin America and the 
weakening of centrally planned economies in Central and Eastern Europe. Decentralization was 
seen as an efficient means of service delivery and an effective 'self-help' approach to 
1 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka I. U.S. 347-483 (1954). 
.. ·\ ') r.• 
empowering the poor. 2 Caught in the international tide of decentralization demands, education 
became a locally provisioned good. Ensuring equal access. to public schools was no longer one 
' ., I 
of the central government's primary responsibilities. 
2 
Perhaps nowhere in recent history were the demands for decentralization more prominent 
than in South Africa. Previously excluded from the decision-making process under apartheid, 
black South Africans viewed decentralization as a means to creating the new South Africa they 
envisioned: one that was accountable, transparent, and inclusive. Kauzya (2007) observes that 
South Africa's radical departure from apartheid governance was aimed at "rebuilding local 
communities and environments, as the basis for a democratic, integrated, prosperous and truly 
non-racial society."3 But while the rhetoric supporting decentralization offered a response to the 
abuses of power under apartheid, the state's failure to recognize education as a precondition for 
democracy signaled the ensuing :shohcomings of decentralization. Complicating the state's 
decision to decentralize education was local governments' reliance on market mechanisms to 
fund public schools. Beard and Miraftab (2008) note one of the paradoxes of the post-apartheid 
state by observing its combination
1 
of "political liberation: and economic liberalization."4 
I ' ' ' ~ ' I t I 
Education was no longer a good valued in a democratic society, but an exclusive, market 
provisioned service based on one's ability to pay. 
This essay focuses on this narrow aspect within the greater decentralization debate by 
assessing the effectiveness of decentralized markets for education. I assume that an educated 
public is required for democratic principles to flourish. What I seek to understand is whether a 
democratic provisioning of this important social good is required to secure the democratic ends 
of education. Put negatively, can the ends of education be secured via a non-democratic, market 
provisioning of education? In bridging educational decentralization and democracy, I focus on 
the process of provisioning this essential public good, and more specifically, I assess the norms 
that guide participants' actions and decisions within the decentralized education market. 
2 G. Shabbir Cheema and Dennis A Rondinelli, "From Government Decentralization to Decentralized Governance," 
ed. G. Shabbir Cheema and Dennis A. Rondinelli, Decentralizing Governance (Washington D.C.: Brookings 
Institute Press, 2007), 3. 
3 John-Mary Kauzya, "Political Decentralization in Africa: Experiences of Uganda, Rwanda and South Africa," ed. 
G. Shabbir Cheema and Dennis A. Rondinelli, Decentralizing Governance (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute 
Press, 2007), 78. 
4 Victoria A. Beard and Faranak Miraftab and Christopher Silver, Planning and Decentralization (New York: 
Routledge, 2008), 221. 
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My critique stems from this normative foundation by io~king at the ways a decentralized 
market for education corrupts important democratic values. I tum to Anderson' s notion of 
"sphere differentiation" to substantiate this point. Anderson suggests that the market, an 
inherently egoistic and exclusive institution, corrupts the way we value public goods. Based on 
the corruptive influence of the market, Anderson cautions that we must limit the market's role in 
order to preserve important social norms required for democracy. By using her ethical 
framework as a foundation for my case study, I proposed the following question: do market 
norms evidence themselves in South Africa's decentralized education system, and do these 
norms corrupt important social values required for democracy? 
During the field-research phase, I interviewed members on both sides of South Africa' s 
education market: "producers of education," which included members of the Durban Academy's 
School Governing Body (SGB), the teachers, and principals; and the "consumers of education," 
which included the parents and learners. Based on the data collected, I discovered a relationship 
consistent with Anderson's theoretical discussion, which .suggests that markets in education 
undermine important social values (e.g. norms of inclusion, personal interaction, and an exercise 
of voice to promote change) required for democracy. I suggest that the entangling relationship 
between educational decentralization and the market may require a democratic provisioning of 
education in order to secure the conditions required for sustaining a genuine participatory 
democracy. The general structure of this essay is as follows: 
Section 1 explains how education promotes norms of civic responsibility and encourages 
moral development. I argue that these factors are required for democratic institutions to 
function. Also included in this section is a general overview of the political and financial reasons 
central governments have supported educatio,nal decentralization and a brief discussion on how 
local governments have coped with added financial responsibilities by relying on user fees. The 
final segment of this section offers a brief assessment on the impact school fees have had on 
learner access and community participation in developing nations. 
Section 2 relates the theoretical framework for my case study by addressing the ethical 
concerns of market distributions of education. The primary goal of this section is to outline 
Anderson's argument of "sphere differentiation." In order to place Anderson's argument in 
context however, I introduce this section with a brief overview of the history, ideas, and legacy 
of apartheid as it relates to the current socio-economic and political context in South Africa. 
With this theoretical understanding of education markets in mind, Section 3 opens with 
an overview of Bantu Education and then assesses the goals of the People's Education 
movement. In addition, the unique faetors driving educational decentralization in South Africa 
are discussed. The primary aim of this1 section, however, is to outline the central tenets 
established by SASA. In particular, I observe the legislation's stipulation for SGB control over 
school fees and assess what this stipulation has meant in terms of educational redress. 
Section 4 marks a break with the overall-structure of the essay, as I shift toward the field 
research phase of the project. In this ·section, I specify the goals of my research, offer a brief 
description of Durban Academy, and explain the reasons why the school was selected. 
4 
Section 5 reports the findings of my case study. Included in this section is qualitative and 
quantitative data on the impact school fees have had on both producers and consumers of 
education. 
Section 6 draws conclusions from the case study and returns to the question of 
educational decentralization. This section critically evaluates South Africa's neglect of public 
education financing, but acknowledges the state's recent efforts to remedy the market's effects 
through a re-centralization of education policy. 
Section 7 offers final concluding remarks on the ethical concerns of South Africa's 
decentralized education market. I conclude that while the ends of education in sustaining 
democracy are well understood and accepted, the particular methods for provisioning education 
continue to be debated. What the case study suggests is that a market provision of education 
should be removed from this debate based on its subversive impact on the norms required for 
democracy. 
I ' 
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1. The International Trend toward Educational Decentralization 
Education and Democracy 
Education is widely regarded as a necessary background condition for social equality and 
democracy. The potential for citizens to participate on equal footing with their peers hinges 
upon equal access to education. According to a 1993 UNICEF document on the international 
state of public schooling, "Education is the single most vital factor for the realization of 
fundamental rights, and promotes a civil society committed to transparency, good governance, 
and social inclusion." 1 Education enhances civil society's ability to work collectively in 
resolving social issues and their capacity to hold government officials accountable. 
An important aspect of education is its role in encouraging values of civic responsibility 
through intellectual and moral development. In Colby et al. 's (2003) Educating Citizens, the 
authors cite Lawrence Kohl berg's research on the stages of educational development to describe 
the process of moral development in young students. Commenting on the development of 
learners' sensibilities toward their peers, Kohlberg observes, "They begin to approach moral 
questions form the perspective of a member of a community rather than only in individual terms 
and also begin to comprehend the idea of shared norms."2 This shared understanding of 
contemporary social problems is an essential precondition for democracy. Implicit in Kohlberg's 
statement is an acknowledgement that children are not passive recipients of culture and social 
norms, but rather, active participants in the construction of their own moral sensibilities.3 It is 
through interaction with their peers, parents, and social institutions that learners can develop into 
complete citizens. 
Education is thus a collective good with positive externalities accruing to everyone in 
society. We all have a stake in the education of our future community members and leaders. In 
addition, education promotes social stability by encouraging values of inclusion, removing 
barriers to integration, delegitimizing cultural myths and stereotypes, and uprooting traditional 
views of inferiority and exclusion. By emphasizing the role of the community and by 
encouraging students to recognize their role within a larger societal context, education allows for 
1 UNICEF, The State of the World 's Children 1999: The Right to Education (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1999), 13 . 
2 Anne Colby, Thomas Ehrlich, Elizabeth Beaumont, and Jason Stephens, Educating Citizens (San Francisco: The 
Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 2003 ), 103. 
3 ibid., 101. 
5 
democratic institutions and practices to flourish. Based on these reasons, Colby et al. contend 
that it is at "the heart of democracy's future in America."4 As important as education is to 
democracy in the U.S., it may hold far greater importance for transitioning democracies, 
especially those with a history of past injustice. 
Why Equal Access to Education is required for Democracy 
Based on the importance of education in sustaining democracy, the absence of equal 
education can severely constrain the realization of this end. Geo-Jaja (2006) observes the 
harmful effects that result from a lack of equal access to education by stating, "Social justice is 
manifest in unaffordable and poor quality education as well as in denial of education that might 
lead to complete citizenship."5 The denial of education undermines the fundamental principles 
of democracy by allowing the government to pursue its own agenda, free from public scrutiny 
and majority interests . Without education, the public can never realize the ends of "complete 
citizenship." In addition, if limited education results in limited power, 6 then unequal education 
allows privileged groups in society to dominate the interests of others. Colby et al. and 
Anderson (2007) elaborate on the importance of equal access to education. 
6 
Both Colby et al. and Anderson argue that in order to respond to contemporary social 
issues, learners must not only develop a sense of moral judgment, but must also be willing to act 
upon this judgment. In order to create a "responsiveness" to social needs, the authors argue that 
equal education across the racial and economic spectrum must be established. On one end of the 
spectrum, Colby et al. lament the ailing sense of political efficacy for learners forced to attend 
poorer schools. 7 According to the authors, lower socioeconomic groups and racial minorities 
score lower on measures of political efficacy, which contributes to feelings of being "further 
immobilized by the apparent hopelessness of the situation."8 On the other end of the spectrum, 
students attending higher quality schools succumb to what Anderson refers to as, "knowledge 
4 ibid., 53. 
5 MacLeans A. Geo-Jaja, "Educational Decentralization, Public Spending, and Social Justice in Nigeria," 
International Review of Education 52 . (2006): 130. 
6 Reference Secretary General, Kofi Annan's pos ition on education: "Knowledge is power. Information is liberating. 
Education is the premise of progress, in every society, in every family ." (Source:http: //www.un.org/sg/annan.shtml). 
7 Colby et al., define political efficacy as a genuine belief in what one does will lead to success or c~ance of making 
an impact. 
8 Ibid ., 125. 
6 
7 
deficits on the part of the advantaged."9 Anderson suggests that economically stratified access to 
education deprives elites of social capital by limiting their awareness and responsiveness to the 
pressing issues facing society. Critical of economically stratified access to education, she 
concludes, "I claim that possession of academic knowledge alone is not sufficient to qualify a 
segregated, multiply advantaged elite for positions of leadership and responsibility in a 
democratic society." 10 
Consistent with Colby et al. and Anderson, John Adams emphasizes the importance of an 
equal provision of education in sustaining democracy. In drafting the Constitution of the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, John Adams spoke of the importance of the state's equal 
provision of education: 
Wisdom and knowledge, as well as virtue, diffused generally among the body of people being 
necessary for the preservation of their rights and liberties; and as these depend on spreading the 
opportunities and advantages of education in various parts of the country, and among the different 
orders of the people, it shall be the duty of legislators and magistrates in all future periods of this 
commonwealth to cherish the interests of literature and the sciences, and all seminaries of them. 
Adams's understanding of education, as more than simply a training ground for intellectual 
development, identifies the essential aspects of education in encouraging civic responsibility. 
Adams is correct to observe that education ought to diffuse "among the different orders of the 
people." In order to ensure long-term sustainability of democracy, education must be a good 
provisioned equally among all groups of society. 
The Political Appeal of Educational Decentralization 
Understanding the importance of education, what is the state ' s role in the provisioning of 
this essential good? Weiler ' s (1990) comparative analysis of educational decentralization 
suggests that politicians desire to avoid the contentious policy area and are inclined to delegate 
responsibilities for this ' third-rail' issue. According to Weiler, education is a source of conflict 
because it plays a pivotal role in determining a society's social hierarchy and is the principal 
means through which values and norms are passed between generations. 11 Acknowledging the 
potential pitfalls of an ineffective delivery of this important social good, central governments are 
9 Elizabeth Anderson, "Fair Opportunity in Education: A Democratic Equality Perspective," Ethics 117 (2007) : 598. 
'
0 Ibid., 609. 
11 Hans N. Weiler, "Comparative Perspectives on Educational Decentralization: An Exercise in Contradiction?" 
Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis 12 (1990): 440. 
7 
disposed to devolve educational decisions to lower levels of government, or at least make the 
appearance of devolving important decisionmaking power. 
8 
Weiler explains the two motivations accounting for politicians' desire to devolve 
education policy. First, politicians desire to contain and isolate educational policy conflict. 
Weiler describes the benefits of devolving decisionmaking power in education: "It allows the 
state to diffuse the sources of conflicts and to provide additional layers of insulation between 
them and the rest of the system." 12 In line with the insulating benefits acquired through a 
devolution of education policy, Weiler explains that the complexity of locally-specific education 
demands constantly threatens the government's legitimacy. Decentralization allows central 
governments to reign in whatever political legitimacy they can.13 
But in decentralizing educational policy, central governments are confronted with an 
ultimatum: how to appear legitimate in the eyes of the public, while still maintaining control over 
the essential policy area of education. Again, decentralization offers a solution to the state's 
contradictory aims. Here, Weiler's division between the regulatory and allocative aspects of 
decentralization is helpful. Weiler explains that central governments are willing to devolve 
"allocative" responsibilities (funding of education), but are often unwilling to surrender 
"regulatory" responsibilities (e.g. national standards, accreditation rules, and national 
curriculum).14 Weiler agrees that a degree of central control over education may be required and 
observes, "Curricula, qualifications, and examinations need to be reasonably similar across the 
national or sub-national unit so as to facilitate mobility, the exchange of personnel, and the 
mutual recognition of diplomas across different regions." 15 But despite the importance of 
national standards, the appearance of devolving power while off-loading financial 
responsibilities for education is one of the principle factors accounting for the failure of 
educational decentralization. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid., 442. An important underlying assumption is that politicians may not be concerned so much with the 
effective delivery of education inasmuch as they may be concerned with how the public perceives of their efforts to 
deliver education. 
14 Ibid., 435-36 . 
15 Ibid. 
8 
9 
Central Government Arguments for Educational Decentralization 
In order to achieve the contradictory aims of educational decentralization, central 
governments rely on two arguments: first, that decentralization will resolve the inefficiencies of a 
centralized provision by incorporating locally specific information; and second, that 
decentralization improves communal participation in the running of schools. In the first case, 
central governments argue that improved familiarity with local conditions results in a more 
accurate meeting of supply and demand and a more economic utilization of resources. 16 
Although decentralization sacrifices potential benefits in economies of scale, this cost is 
outweighed by the efficiency benefits that accrue from improved information at the local level. 
Decentralization, they contend, creates an education system with national curricula and standards 
that is flexible to local variations. 
In terms of the second argument, central governments promise enhanced decision making 
authority in the running of schools. Geo-Jaja explains that in an ideal setting, decentralization 
extends power and increases community participation by removing centralized control over 
management and administration of public education. 17 But realizing this ideal of effective 
communal participation is highly dependent on the motivations leading to decentralization in the 
first place. Clarifying his criticism of the state's position on education funding, Geo-Jaja 
explains, "The grim reality is that the depth and, ultimately, the outcome of decentralization 
reforms depend on the motives, the political commitment, and the centrality of the state in the 
funding and distribution of resources to education."18 Geo-Jaja's observation suggests that the 
rift between the ideals of effective decentralization and the reality of ineffective decentralization 
are largely attributable to the motives behind central governments ' decisions. We return now to 
an analysis of the allocative functions devolved from the center to the local governments. 
Financial Incentives to Decentralize 
While central governments may believe in decentralization's ability to improve efficiency 
and to empower local governments, one of their primary motivations to decentralize education 
policy is to off-load financial responsibilities. Weiler describes the central government's logic 
16 Ibid., 437. 
17 Macleans A. Geo-Jaja, "Decentralisation and Privatisation of Education in Africa: Which Option for Nigeria?" 
International Review of Education 50 (2004): 310. 
18 Ibid., 311 . 
9 
by observing decentralization's potential to incorporate "untapped local and private resources 
into the overall resource pool available to education." 19 Decentralization increases the 
10 
possibility for revenue-sharing not available under a centralized education system. Central 
governments argue that since decentralization increases power sharing, local governments should 
assume added financial responsibilities as well. Weiler clarifies this relationship: 
This expectation is directed particularly at the local community, which, in return for a greater role in 
the making of educational decisions, is expected to express a stronger sense of commitment to the 
overall educational enterprise by generating added resources for school construction and maintenance, 
teacher salaries, and the like.20 
But the pivotal assumption here is that educational decentralization results in the genuine 
incorporation of local voices. But how much power is truly devolved to the local level? 
Geo-Jaja, Weiler, and Sayed agree that national government control over education is 
never completely surrendered. National governments are unwilling to relinquish genuine control 
over education, while concurrently devolving financial responsibilities to local governments. In 
defending his observation, Sayed cites the 1988 Education Reform Act in England and Wales 
and Australia's "Tomorrow's Schools." Both cases of educational decentralization occurred 
within a centralized structure where complete devolution was never realized, but only a 
decentralization of fiscal responsibilities. 21 Supporting Sayed's analysis, Geo-Jaja describes the 
contradictions of educational decentralization by observing, "Hence, centralization of 
educational-outcomes requirements is accompanied by decentralization of the costs of achieving 
those outcomes."22 Thus, educational decentralization is an attempt by the state to operate at a 
distance, reaping the legitimacy benefits of appearing to empower local communities, while 
maintaining control over critical aspects of education policy. Educational decentralization 
amounts to nothing more than a "cost-cutting exercise,"23 which leaves local government 
responsible for generating their own sources of revenue to fund public schools. 
19 Weiler, 437. 
20 Ibid. 
2 1 Yusuf Sayed, "Understanding Educational Decentralization in Post-Apartheid South Africa," The Journal of 
Negro Education 66 (1997): 354. 
22 Geo-Jaja, "Decentralisation and Privatisation," 309. 
23 Sayed, 360. 
10 
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Local Governments and the Introduction of User Fees 
In assuming financial responsibility of education, local governments have relied on user 
fees to generate revenue. Wehner (2000) describes the advantages of user fees for generating 
local revenue by noting, "All levels of government can use user charges and license fees , but 
they are especially appropriate for local governments to the extent that costs and benefits are 
'internalized' to the local taxpayer."24 Similarly, Bahl et al. (2003) argue that user fees at the 
local level promote efficiency in consumption by making costs of public services explicit to local 
consumers. 
25 The authors add that user charges are an "attractive feature" for funding 
decentralized policies. 26 Supporting both Wehner' s and Bahl et al.' s observations, Bardhan 
(2002) argues that user charges are a useful means for local governments to meet local needs 
without placing a substantial burden on the poor, since "no user is compelled to use the 
service. "27 
But here, Bardhan adds an important disclaimer that the other authors overlook, namely 
that "User charges cannot, however, be used to finance antipoverty programs such as targeted 
public distribution of food, education or health services."28 Although no user is compelled to 
"use" education, the treatment of education as a trade-good (e.g. waste removal, paving roads) 
can have a devastating impact on the poor, who may be unable to pay the user fees required for 
their child's education. Bardhan's distinction between local 'trading' goods (e.g. water, cement) 
and social goods (e.g. education and health care) adds an important element to the fiscal 
decentralization of education. Despite Bardhan's warning, user fees have become local 
government's primary means of funding education. 
Local governments have accepted the arguments in favor of user fees and have relied 
extensively on school fees to fund public education. Proponents argue that school fees will make 
costs for education apparent to the 'consumer,' resulting in a more economic utilization of 
resources. In the education market, school fees operate as a function of quality in which the 
higher the school fees the greater the educational product received. Sayed describes the way 
24 Joachim Wehner, " Fiscal Federalism in South Africa," Publius 30 (2000): 50. 
25 Roy Bahl, Paul Smoke, and David Solomon, "Overview of the Local Government Revenue System," ed. Roy 
Bahl and Paul Smoke, Restructuring Local Government Finance in Developing Countries Lessons from South 
Africa (Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2003): 76. 
26 Ibid., 89. 
27 Pranab Bardhan, "Decentralizaiton of Governance and Development," The Journal of Economic Perspectives 16. 
(2002): 193. 
28 Ibid., 194. 
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school fees have become the new basis for assessing quality in education: "User fees secure 
market logic by engendering commitment to monetary transaction as a basis for the 
determination of educational quality and worth."29 Such emphasis on school fees has redefined 
how both schools and their ' consumers' operate in decentralized systems of education. 
As in markets for trade-goods, the market in education has encouraged competition 
among its producers. Sayed coins the phrase, "school-as-educational-producer" to describe the 
emerging, dual-identity of schools. Since schools rely on user fees to maintain school quality 
and to pay for various educational expenses that include teacher salaries and classroom 
resources, schools compete to 'sell' their product to those consumers who are able to afford their 
services. By actively recruiting those consumers with the ability to pay, the school-as-
educational-producer has redefined the role of parents as well. Extending his analogy, Sayed 
explains how parents' roles have shifted from "citizen-parents" to one of "consumer-parents. "30 
Sayed's observation suggests that the market in education does not operate according to normal 
supply and demand curves because school-producers' preference for more affluent parents limits 
the consumers' choice. Thus, the market promise of improved parent choice is limited by the 
soliciting behavior of schools who favor parents with a demonstrated financial capacity to pay 
for their child's education. 31 
Assessing Local Markets/or Education 
If decentralization is the norm for education internationally32 and if it is the most widely 
supported form of educational delivery in terms of international aid from the World Bank and 
IMF,33 what has been the effect on the delivery of public education? Lessons from Asia suggest 
that the effective decentralization of education is unlikely without genuine transfer of decision 
making power to local governments and strong central provision.34 Educational decentralization 
in Zimbabwe, Mali, Ghana, and Nigeria suggest a similar financial commitment by the national 
government to secure equal access to public schools.35 Issues of class stratification have also 
been evidenced in Ghana and Cote d' Ivore where increases in school fees have negatively 
29 Sayed, 359. 
30 Ibid., 361. 
3 1 Ibid. , 362. 
32 Ibid. , 354. 
33 Geo-Jaja, "Educational Decentralization," 127. 
34 Geo-Jaja, "Decentralisation and Privatisation," 314. 
35 Ibid. , 316. 
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affected learners ' access .to quality, affordable education. 36 A common effect of decentralized 
education markets is the forced option scenario, where poor households must decide which of 
their children will attend school. The international trend in educational decentralization has seen 
a reproduction of inequalities by extending economic disparities to the education sector. But 
even in developed countries, decentralization has failed to pass the equity test. Decentralized 
allocation of funding in Norway for instance resulted in an educational report identifying, 
"potential difficulties in decentralization with regard to both equity and standards."37 
Supporting international research on educational decentralization, Geo-Jaja's extensive 
research into Nigeria's funding for educational decentralization identifies the limitations of 
school fees. Geo-Jaja observes that the implementation of school fees has excluded a substantial 
segment of school-age children from accessing schools and was the primary reason for parents to 
remove their children from school.38 According to Geo-Jaja, Nigeria ' s central government 
allocates a mere 3 percent of current national expenditure, while claiming to have devolved 
decision making power to local governments. 39 With reduced central provision and the onus of 
school funding placed on local governments, school fees have become the most widely accepted 
method for local funding of education. Consequently, school fees have expanded the education 
gap in Nigeria, especially in terms of per-student spending and student-teacher ratio .40 Nigeria' s 
education market has transformed access to public education into an economically based 
selection process where learners from disadvantaged backgrounds are often denied access and 
where under-resourced communities are continually penalized for their inability to generate 
funds. 41 Thus, educational decentralization has had a limited and negative impact on issues of 
social justice and equity in most developing countries. 
Recap of the Trend toward Educational Decentralization 
Despite the importance of equal access to education in sustaining democracy, central 
governments have supported educational decentralization to insulate themselves from criticism 
and to shirk financial responsibilities for education. Although promising greater decision 
36 Geo-Jaja, "Educational Decentralization," 137-38. 
37 Weiler, 436. 
38 Geo-Jaja, , " Decentralisation and Privatisation," 317. 
39 Geo-Taja, "Educational Decentralization," 138. 
40 Ibid., 129. 
41 Geo-Jaj a, , "Decentralisation and Privatisation," 315 . 
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making power to local governments, central governments have maintained policy control over 
education, while reaping legitimacy benefits of apparent power-sharing. Weiler summarizes the 
impact of educational decentralization on local power by remarking, "Decentralization and 
community participation are frequently just a model to which it is fashionable to pay lip 
service."42 Decentralization entails a process of disruption in the social relationships 
surrounding education, communities, and the state. The promises of decentralization are made 
meaningless by the perverse nature of fiscal decentralization and the introduction of school fees. 
As a result, education's ability to equip students with a sense of civic responsibility is threatened 
by the market' s exclusive method of provisioning access based on an ability to pay. With this 
general overview of educational decentralization, the next section introduces Anderson's 
theoretical framework for understanding how the market can undermine important social values. 
42 Weiler, 438. 
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2. Ethical Limitations of the Market 
Since our primary concern is the relationship between educational decentralization and its 
implications for democracy, one way to assess the interaction of the two fields is to identify the 
norms required for both institutions to function effectively. This section addresses the 
concerning implications arising from markets in education by contrasting market values with the 
social norms required for democracy. Part 2 contains three sections. The first section provides a 
context for the discussion on education markets by relating the history of apartheid and the 
current social conditions in post-apartheid South Africa. The second section outlines Elizabeth 
Anderson's argument in the "Ethical Limitations of the Market," which will serve as my ethical 
lens in organizing and understanding the qualitative data acquired through my case study. The 
final segment pulls together scholarly evidence explaining why education is better valued by 
nonmarket norms. 
The Apartheid Context 
Before addressing the ethical concerns of a market provision education, we first need to 
consider the context of our case study and the way that the apartheid past has shaped the public's 
demands for equal education. In his comparative essay, "Race Making and the Nation State," 
Anthony Marx (1996) identifies the central role of the state in creating racial categories. 
According to Marx, "Race is not found, but 'made' and used." 1 In South Africa, Dutch and 
British colonists emphasized racial differences to suppress intra-white conflict and to strengthen 
white dominance over the 'inferior' black race. 
The arrival of the Dutch East India Company in 1652 established the fundamental pattern 
of white supremacy that would later be institutionalized in 1948.2 Labor shortages in the nascent 
Dutch establishment in Cape Town led to the enslavement of the Khoikhoi population. Marx 
observes, however, that while Afrikaner slavery did not preclude segregation, it fostered attitudes 
of black inferiority and established patterns of racial domination. 3 The so-called "proper 
relations between master and servant" developed primarily through white compromises made at 
the expense of the black majority. 
1 Anthony W. Marx, "Race Making and the Nation State" World Politics 48 (1996): 180. 
2 George M. Fredrickson, White Supremacy A Comparative Study in American and South African History (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 3. 
3 Marx, 184. 
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In the early 1830s Afrikaners left the Cape Colony in protest of the British's ' liberal 
treatment of slaves.4 Disagreement culminated in the Boer Wars (1st Boer War from 1880-1881 
and the 2nd Boer War from 1899 to 1902).5 But the costly British victory in the 2nd Boer War 
encouraged the British to prioritize white unity over their commitment to a more liberal 
treatment of slaves. As Marx describes, "Union was achievable only on the Boers' terms, 
contrary to expectations among the colored and African populations that a British victory would 
consolidate reforms."6 The new white coalition was formalized in the 1902 peace treaty. 
Peaceful relations were founded upon a common goal of maintaining white privilege and 
sustaining dominance over the blacks. 
Coinciding with the rise of formal apartheid was the industrialization of South Africa, 
which was fueled by the discovery of gold in the early 20111 Century. 7 While capitalism 
encouraged a race-neutral economic policy, the government was intent on protecting the interests 
of the white labor force. In his economic discussion of race, Marx describes the roots of 
apartheid in "an effort to protect whites from black competition."8 The white minority justified 
racial exclusion by relying on the disclaimer that "Disorder and violence destroys business 
altogether."9 According to the white officials, separate development was the only way for the 
nation to advance economically. Marx phrases the paradoxical relationship of capitalism and 
apartheid well, when he states that business was forced to 'comply' with state-sanctioned 
segregation. 10 Despite the tremendous cost of regulation and manifold inefficiencies, the 
Afrikaner party moved to formalize apartheid in 1948. 
4 Dissatisfied with British rule and notions of equality in Gelykstelling principles, the Boers decided to leave the 
Cape Colony in the early l 830's (Fredrickson, 176). During the Great Trek, the Boers viewed themselves as 
pastoral people wandering through an unholy land. By invoking the "Curse on Ham," the Boers argued that 
nonwhites were damned to endure a life of servitude. With the incorporation of the Pauline doctrine, which stated 
that "obedience to masters was a Christian duty" (Fredrickson 84), the Boers harmonized the policies of black 
subjugation with the Bible 's teachings . Slowly, race replaced religion as the overriding factor to justify white 
supremacist views. Fredrickson describes the evolution of Boer-nonwhite relations by noting, " It was no longer 
religion and race but race alone that was the essential distinguishing mark of the slave class" (Fredrickson, 84). 
5 Marx, 194. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid., 189. 
8 Ibid .. 
9 Ibid., 191. 
IO Ibid. 
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Once in power, the NP began implementing their 'separate development' agenda. 
Between 1949 and 1970, the NP passed 25 laws designed to further the goals of apartheid. 11 
Steve Biko, black activist leader and one of the founders of Black Consciousness, describes the 
social and psychological impact of apartheid on the everyday lives of black South Africans by 
stating, "No black man can ever be absolutely sure he is not breaking the law." 12 Consistent with 
Biko's observation is Justice John Marshall Harlan's rhetorical question, which emphasizes the 
devastating effects of state sanctioned racism: "What can more certainly arouse race hate, what 
more certainly create and perpetuate a feeling of distrust between these races than state 
enactments?" 13 But it was the central role of the state in magnifying racial differences ultimately 
led to the countermobilization efforts from the black resistance movement. 
The creation of the apartheid-state, while beneficial to the white minority in the short-run, 
created a black identity that would eventually mobilize against the injustice of apartheid. Marx 
argues that the establishment of apartheid forged, what he calls, "group self-consciousness 
among blacks." 14 Apartheid policies emphasized racial categories, creating a black group 
identity that would mobilize in opposition of white supremacy. 15 Marx cites the evolution of the 
ANC to further this point. When apartheid was in its formative state, the ANC was a small, 
elitist, organization. But when the NP institutionalized segregation under apartheid, the ANC 
gained massive public support. In addition, the starker definition of races and brutality of legal 
statutes encouraged more militant offshoots of the ANC, like the Pan Africanist Congress. 
With escalating economic costs, mounting internal pressure, and increasing international 
resentment of apartheid, the NP opened negotiations for a post-apartheid, democratic society. In 
1994, South Africa held its first democratic elections and elected Nelson Mandela as the nation's 
first black president. But post-apartheid South Africa has struggled to satisfy the conflicting 
policy aims of the black majority's demands for social reform with the need to stabilize the 
11 According to David Harrison's The White Tribe of Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 159, 
one of the NP's first measure however was to ensure their reelection by disenfranchising the black majority's right 
to vote and limiting the immigration of English immigrants. 11 These voting regulations made it virtually impossible 
for a competing party to overtake the NP. A few of the most corrupt laws included, Mixed Marriages Act, the 
Immorality Act, the Population Registration Act, and the Group Areas Act. 11 Of the remaining 22 apartheid acts 
that were passed between 1949 and 1970, the most prominent include: the 1952 Pass Laws, the 1953 Bantu 
Education Act, and the 1967 Terrorism Act. 
12 Steve Biko, I Write What I like (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2002), 75. 
13 Marx, 192. 
14 Ibid., 200. 
15 Ibid. As in Brazil ' s case of "racial democracy," where no formal system of apartheid or Jim Crow was instituted, 
but de facto racial superiority stemming from Portuguese colonialism remained unchallenged. 
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economy and attract foreign capital. Louw describes the ANC's position within this tangled 
political and economic context by remarking, "This state is characterized by a balance of power 
that sees the ANC constrained by a (mostly white) internal corporate sector that is allied to the 
powerful external forces of globalized capitalism." 16 While Mandela focused on issues of 
reconciliation and reconstruction, his predecessor, Thabo Mbeki, aligned more closely with 
business interests and neoliberal economic policies. This shift in policy agendas has led to high 
unemployment, continued uneven development among the races, and a continued struggle to 
attract foreign capital due to a largely unskilled labor force. 17 The legacy of apartheid is very 
much apart of life in contemporary South Africa. 
Understanding the history of apartheid and the pervasive inequalities throughout 
contemporary South Africa, the goal of equal education gains an added importance to the 
country's attempts to establish a multiracial democracy. With this context in mind, we return to 
our discussion on the merits of the education market. The following section offers a theoretical 
discussion on the limits of market provisions of public goods and outlines the ways in which the 
market can limit freedom and autonomy. 
Anderson-Ethical Concerns over Market Mechanisms 
In "The Ethical Limitation of the Market," Anderson explains the important role of the 
state in limiting the scope of the market in order to preserve citizens ' freedom and autonomy. 
Anderson' s argument is based on an assessment of market exchanges as transactions guided by 
self-interested norms. She is concerned with the state's reliance on markets as a mechanism to 
distribute public goods and argues that failing to regulate the market can undermine the way we 
value shared goods by allowing market norms to corrupt the values within nonmarket domains. 18 
By reducing the options through which a citizen can value a particular good and replacing social 
norms of valuation, the market limits individual freedom and autonomy. 
Since Anderson's argument centers on the protection of individual freedom and 
autonomy, a proper conception of these terms, as understood by Anderson, is required. 
Anderson defines freedom as having a wide range of options through which one can express 
16 P. Eric Louw, The Rise, Fall, and Legacy of Apartheid (Westport: Praeger, 2004), 195. 
17 Ibid., 198-99. Around 41.5% unemployed at 2001 (see Louw, 179). Louw notes that most of the blacks are 
trapped in an expanding underclass, characterized by township living, menial labor jobs, and a reliance on labor 
unions to preserve whatever earnings and benefits presently accruing to them. 
18Anderson, 144. 
their diverse valuations. Autonomy is understood as the ability to govern oneself according to 
the principles one reflectively endorses.19 Anderson is concerned with freedom and autonomy 
in relation to the corruptive influence of market norms. She argues that market norms stand in 
contrast to nonmarket norms in five ways: they are impersonal, egoistic, exclusive, want-based, 
and provide ' exit ' instead of 'voice' as a means to influence policy outcomes.20 
19 
In the first instance, economic transactions are impersonal, since as Anderson notes, 
"Money income, not one ' s social status, characteristics, or relationships, determines one's access 
to commodities."21 Relationships in the market are formed in virtue of another's capital, not 
upon their personal characteristics. Second, market exchanges are guided by egoism, which 
Anderson defines as, "When each party defines and satisfies her interests independent of the 
other."22 One involved in market exchanges rarely considers the well-being of the other, so long 
as their individual wants are satisfied. In the third case, economic transactions are exclusive 
since access is limited to the purchaser.23 Property rights are acquired through the purchase of 
commodities, which grants the owner the freedom to exclude whomever he/she chooses. Fourth, 
economic transactions are want-based in that they satisfy "desires backed by the ability to pay." 
Anderson clarifies her description of want-based norms by noting that the market does not draw 
a distinction between one's "urgent needs" and "intense desires."24 Finally, economic 
transactions promote exit over voice in that a consumer uses the practice of exit, or ending 
business, to enact change. A customer has no right to directly participate in the design of the 
product or to determine how it is marketed. 25 
It is worthwhile to make a brief aside and expand upon Anderson's notion of exit and 
voice since these norms weigh in heavily on the effectiveness of democracy. Hirschman (1970) 
focuses specifically on the practice of exit and voice as it relates to firms' and states' ability to 
recuperate from setbacks or failures. Hirschman defines exit from a management perspective, by 
stating that exit, "Keeps consumers from complaining."26 Firms who emphasize exit practices, 
encourage a take-it or leave-it approach to problem solving. In contrast, voice involves "interest 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid, 144-45 . 
2 1 Ibid, 145. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ib id, 146. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Albert 0. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), 27. 
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articulation," and involves more of an attempt to change rather than escape from an 
objectionable state of affairs. 27 Hirschman specifies his notion of voice by comparing it to exit 
practices: 
It is a far more 'messy ' concept because it can be graduated, all the way from faint grumbling to 
violent protest; it implies articulation of one ' s critical opinions rather than a private, "secret" vote in 
the anonymity of a supermarket, and finally, it is direct and straightforward rather than roundabout. 
Voice is political action par excellence."28 
While exit is a clear-cut either or decision, voice comes in many degrees and forms. Of 
particular importance to our discussion on education as it relates to democracy is Hirschman's 
acknowledgement of the essential role voice plays in political settings. Voice is "political action 
par excellence" because it ensures political effectiveness and state accountability. 
Returning to Anderson' s discussion on market norms, she argues that the nature of 
economic goods and the 'use' mode of valuation we associate with these goods conflict with 
personal and social valuations common to civil society and required for democracy. 29 Values of 
cooperation, personal communication, and voice are replaced by economic norms of 
impersonality, egoism, and exclusiveness. When market norms undermine social values and 
limit the range of significant options one can pursue, individual freedom is limited as well. 
Similarly, autonomy is compromised when market valuations replace the options by which one 
can reflectively endorse.30 
Based on the corruptive influence of market norms, Anderson argues for a system of 
"sphere differentiation."31 Sphere differentiation involves the separation of goods into multiple 
spheres, which preserves each good's distinct modes of valuation. She argues that the practice of 
boundary setting will protect individual freedom and autonomy by preserving a range of diverse 
opportunities for one to value a particular good. 32 Soule (2003) succinctly summarizes 
Anderson's theory: "Anderson's aim is freedom and autonomy through protective spheres that 
27 Ibid., 30. 
28 Ibid. , 16. 
29 Ibid, 155. 
30 Edward Soule, Morality & Markets: The Ethics of Government Regulation (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield 
Publishing Group: 2003 ), 57 . 
31 Anderson, 141 . 
32 Ibid. 
allow goods to be properly valued."33 Preventing the infiltration of market norms enables 
individuals to freely and autonomously pursue those values they deem important. 
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Understanding Anderson's theoretical framework, she proposes a three-step methodology 
to determine whether the state is permitted in regulating market systems. The first step involves 
determining whether a particular good is better valued according to market or nonmarket norms. 
If a good is better valued by nonmarket values, step two asks whether market norms undermine 
important social values belonging to a particular good. If market norms corrupt social values, 
then state regulation is permitted.34 The next section looks to satisfy Anderson ' s first 
requirement and argues that education is better valued according to nonmarket norms. 
Is Education Better Valued by Market or Non-Market Norms? 
Since the goal of education is to prepare learners for civic and democratic participation, it 
is proper that the norms guiding education reflect these values. Anderson argues that education 
is best valued by social norms of democratic values and fraternal relations: 
Democratic ideals strongly inform our conception of elementary and secondary education. A 
principal purpose of education at this level is to prepare children for responsible citizenship, exercised 
in a spirit of fraternity with others of diverse class, racial, and ethnic backgrounds.35 
Since markets promote competition by dividing learners according to the ' ability to pay' 
standard, learners receive an education without first-hand encounters with learners of different 
economic classes. Since class is closely tied to race, especially in the South African context, 
markets undermine the larger aims of education by confining the "spirit of fraternity" to a 
homogenous pool of affluent, white learners or a distinct pool of poor, black learners. 
Supporting Anderson's assessment of democratic conceptions of education, Strain (1995) 
expresses a similar concern over the state ' s increasing reliance on markets as a vehicle to 
distribute educational goods. Basing his argument off of the UK's Education Reform Act of 
1988, Strain argues that markets encourage schools to manage their affairs like businesses in 
competition with neighboring schools. Schools compete to sell education to parent and child 
consumers. 36 According to Strain, the ERA conceives of education as a packaged commodity, 
33 Soule, 58. 
34 Anderson, 144. 
35 Ibid, 162. 
36 Michael Strain, "Autonomy, Schools and the Constitutive Role of Community: Towards a New Moral and 
Poli tical Order for Education," British Journal of Educational Studies 43 (Blackwe ll Publishing: 1995): 5. 
void of any intrinsic worth. By distributing education according to economic standards of 
production and consumption, the market removes forums of communal participation. The lack 
of local democratic organs undercuts the goals of schooling by promoting individualism over 
cooperative fraternal values. 
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Corresponding with Anderson's analysis of market norms, Strain emphasizes the 
importance of 'voice' and 'need-based' values in underpinning our understanding of education. 
He argues that democratic platforms are necessary to give individuals a voice to express their 
educational concerns or needs. When deliberations focus on satisfying the needs of the least 
advantaged instead of promoting competitive individualism, education can realize its promotion 
of democratic ideals. 37 But since the market distributes education in terms of price mechanisms, 
those with the larger incomes will consume more, even though their needs may be less .38 
Strain's analysis expands on Anderson's assessment of markets as mechanisms that do not 
discriminate between 'urgent needs ' and 'intense desires. ' 39 Again, we see how the market fails 
to provide for the least advantaged. Instead of education operating as a mechanism to even out 
class barriers, the introduction of markets into schooling deepens these inequalities. Based on 
the market ' s role in limiting voice and need-regarding ideals, Strain concludes, "Markets, even 
when heavily regulated and administered, induce effects contrary to the values of individual and 
social freedom upon which public education is understood to be founded."40 
Like Strain's support for removing markets from the provision of education, Ranson' s 
(1995) critique emphasizes the inherently self-interested nature of markets and their role in 
undermining the larger social aim of education.41 Though Ranson's criticism is directed at the 
UK' s 1993 Education Act, which calls for a stronger centrally administered market in education, 
his critique of market norms speaks to South Africa' s decentralized education market. As in 
Anderson's assessment of markets as egoistic, Ranson argues that the "individualism of markets" 
erodes democratic values of cooperative deliberation. 42 The promotion of market mechanisms is 
thus inversely related to the promotion of democratic values. 
37 Ib id, 17. 
38 Ibid, 16. 
39 Anderson, 146. 
40 Strain, 4. 
4 1Stewart Ranson, " Public Institutions for Cooperative Action : A Reply to James Tooley" British Journal of 
Educational Studies 43 (1995): 35. 
42 Ib id, 36. 
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Unique to Ranson's assessment of markets is a holistic understanding of education as a 
social institution designed to prepare learners to address contemporary social ills. Describing the 
current problems of our society, Ranson states, "The problems we face [ ... ] cannot be resolved 
by individuals acting in isolation." Since markets promote individualism instead of cooperation, 
students graduate with a hollow understanding of what it means to engage in collective action. 
Markets fail to realize what democracy alone can establish.43 Ranson concludes that if we are 
committed to preparing learners to address the predicaments of our time, we cannot rely on 
markets as a vehicle for distributing access to education. 
Perhaps the most formidable obstacle confronting the arguments set forth by Anderson, 
Strain, and Ranson, is the libertarian commitment to economic freedom. Philosophers of the 
libertarian camp argue that removing the role of markets in education infringes upon a parent's 
freedom to invest in their child's education. They argue that state involvement limits parent 
choice by prescribing which school their child must attend and confining parents to restrictions 
in locality.44 They argue additionally that free markets are morally superior in that it creates a 
system whereby free and voluntary choices in education are secured through individuals acting 
according to their own moral and prudential interests.45 
But this narrow conception of freedom fails to recognize how an unregulated market can 
severely limit the freedom of poorer individuals. For instance, Ranson describes markets as, 
"formally neutral but substantively interested."46 In other words, though the market appears to 
increase parent choice by ' freeing' parents from poor local schools in their catchment area, this 
increase in economic freedom assumes each person entering the market has the same package of 
capital upon entering the market. In South Africa, centuries of black oppression have tipped the 
scale against the black community. When market mechanisms enter the education sphere, it 
complicates inequalities in income with inequalities in educational opportunity. As a result, 
markets fail to offer disadvantaged communities a fare shake in the educational market. 
Similarly, Strain argues that markets assume that society operates within a 'moral vacuum. ' 47 
But as Ranson describes, social agents are differentiated by virtue of their differences in income, 
43 Ibid, 42. 
44 Strain, 10. 
45 Ibid., 11. 
46 Stewart Ranson, "Markets or Democracy for Education," British Journal of Educational Studies 41 (Blackwell 
Publishing: 1993), 337. 
47 Strain, 15. 
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ethnicity, religion, and culture. Libertarians assume that the actual market is reflective of the 
ideal market where individuals deliberate on an equal playing field and naturally sort themselves 
among various choices in public schools. 
A final complication arising from market systems in education is the conservative 
perspective of voluntariness with regard to the least advantaged in society. Describing the 
market perspective of educational distribution, Ranson notes, "The market can parade under the 
guise of neutrality while any ensuing inequality can hide beneath the illusion that, because the 
agents have acted, they must also have assented."48 Simply because poorer parents choose to 
send their children to poorer schools does not mean that their choices are made voluntarily. 
Inequalities in education cannot be justified simply because parents ' assented' to sending their 
children to lower quality schools. This shallow understanding of voluntariness fails to consider 
the background conditions that may coerce parents to choose and to act in a certain way. For 
rural and township learners, the 'choice' in attending poor local schools is not an expression of 
consent or acceptance of the market system, but simply a decision made within a forced-option 
scenario confined by the limitations of school fees and transportation costs. 
Based on the democratic aims of education and the corrupting effects that the market has 
on the social norms education is designed to promote, I conclude that education is better valued 
according to nonmarket norms. Understanding that education is best provisioned according to a 
non-market, democratic process, the next section relates the primary aspects of South Africa' s 
decentralized education market and the historical forces that led to its creation. 
48 Ranson, "Markets or Democracy," 339. 
25 
3. Educational Decentralization in South Africa 
With a general understanding of apartheid and the ethical limitations of education 
markets, this section focuses specifically on South Africa's education policy. One interesting 
aspect of South Africa's transition toward educational decentralization is the way the nation's 
unique history led to a strong centralized support for equal education for all. Unlike the 
international data that identifies central governments' financial motivations for decentralizing 
education, the ANC demonstrated a willingness to assume financial responsibility for the post-
apartheid education system. But despite the ANC' s support for central funding and control over 
education policy, negotiations during the CODESA (Convention for a Democratic South Africa) 
process allowed for two distinct groups, the black grassroots movement and the National Party, 
to promote their decentralized agenda. In the first segment, I trace the historical forces that led 
to South Africa's transition to a decentralized system of education. I then explain South African 
education policy under the South African Schools Act of 1996 and outline the role of School 
Governing Bodies (SGBs) in providing local platforms for community involvement. In 
particular, an analysis of the reasons why school fees were introduced is explained and 
contrasted to the previous discussion on educational decentralization in developing countries. 
'People's Education/or People's Power' 
When the Nationalist Party passed the Bantu Education Act in 1953, the black resistance 
movement became increasingly fearful of a centrally controlled education system. The "gutter 
education" administered by the apartheid regime was, as Giliomee (2004) observes, "designed to 
prepare blacks for a marginal place in life." 1 The lack ofresources, medium of instruction, and 
poor quality of teaching worked to reproduce the apartheid notion of a subservient black 
population. In response to the oppressive Bantu Education system, the democratic movement 
mobilized under the grassroots organization-People's Education for People's Power. 2 
According to Soobrayan (1990), although the People's Education movement prioritized 
efforts to end Bantu Education, they began outlining a general framework for a post-apartheid 
1 Hermann Giliomee, The Afrikaners Biography of a People (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2004), 
509. 
2 Bobby Soobrayan, "People's Education for People's Power." In Democratic Governance of Public Schooling in 
South Africa. (Natal : Education Policy Unit, 1994), 33 . 
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education system during the struggle. 3 In particular, the movement sought to replace the strong 
central apartheid authority with local structures for community involvement. They reasoned that 
the only way to ensure that local voices would be heard was to decentralize the educational 
policymaking process. Soobrayan describes the rationale behind the People's Education 
movement's emphasis on local control: 
Under Nationalist control education is used to further subservience and oppression. Whereas in the 
hands of the people it becomes a weapon for liberation. Therefore, for education to serve the interests 
of the majority, the majority must not only control it, but the people must also participate in its 
conception, formulation and implementation.4 
Soobrayan's assessment identifies the ways in which the guiding principles of People's 
Education were a response to the abhorred centrally controlled apartheid system. Supporting 
Soobrayan's observation, Fiske and Ladd (2004) argue that the majority viewed schools as 
"instruments of the apartheid government," and that the only way they could overcome their 
deep-rooted distrust over apartheid institutions was to devolve the decision-making processes to 
the local level. 5 Similarly, Dieltiens et al. (2007) describe the movement's commitment to local 
control as an attempt to "undermine structural hierarchies. "6 
Perhaps the clearest indication of the movement's aims is expressed through the words of 
the leaders themselves. In 1996, Walter Sisulu voiced the demands of the People's Education by 
stating, "We are not prepared to accept any 'alternative' to Bantu education that is imposed from 
above."7 Sisulu's comment identifies the merging of liberation ideology and a growing emphasis 
on local control. According to Sisulu, education policy would be decided from the ground up 
through local involvement. But the notion of People's Education was not only an appealing 
euphemism, it was a principle embedded in the Freedom Charter's message that, "The people 
shall govern."8 The movement's rejection of Bantu Education spurred a demand for a 
decentralized system of education. But while the People's Education movement was forced to 
3 ibid. 
4 ibid. 
5 Edward B. Fiske and Helen F. Ladd, Elusive Equity Education Reform in Post-Apartheid South Africa 
(Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 64. 
6 Veere Dieltiens et al. "Changing School Practice: The Role of Democratic School Governance," In Democracy, 
Human Rights ·and Social Justice in Education (B loemfontein: Center for Education Policy Development, 2007): 16. 
7 Education Policy Unit, Democratic Governance of Public Schooling in South Africa (Natal: Education Policy Unit, 
1994), xiv. 
8 Sibusiso Sithole, "Parent-Teacher-Student Associations (PTSAs): Present State and Future Prospects," Democratic 
Governance of Public Schooling in South Africa (Natal: Education Policy Unit, 1994), 47. 
divide its focus between efforts aimed at constructing a post-apartheid education system and 
efforts to topple Bantu Education, the NP was busy constructing their own version of post-
apartheid education policy. 
The NP Perspective-Unilateral Restructuring and the Model C Plan 
27 
Unlike the democratic movement, the state was in an advantageous position by virtue of 
its presiding control over the education system. Pampallis (1993) uses the term, "unilateral 
restructuring," to describe the NP's last-minute attempts to entrench white privilege.9 As in the 
case of the People's Education movement, the NP advocated for a more decentralized system of 
educational decision-making, but for radically different reasons. The NP's conversion of public 
schools to Model C schools marked the first of its efforts to decentralize education policy and 
empower local white communities. 
Beginning in 1991, white public schools were allowed to select from three different 
models from which to begin integrating black students. Initially, three models were proposed: 
Model A converted former state schools to private institutions, Model B allowed state schools to 
remain public institutions, and Model C converted state schools into semi-private state aided 
schools. In April of 1992, the Department of Education and Culture in the House of Assembly 
announced that all white state schools would become Model C schools. While the government 
granted white state schools the alternative to remain Model B through a two-thirds majority vote 
from the parents, schools selecting Model B faced severe funding cutbacks. In addition, these 
schools were not allowed to charge school fees to supplement government funds. As a result of 
the NP's unilateral restructuring, 96% of white state schools became Model C by the end of 
1992. 10 
Dolby's (2001) case study of Fernwood High identifies the rationale behind parents' 
decision to support the Model C option. According to Dolby, the appeal of Model C rested in the 
considerable control parents had over the integration process. 11 Dolby describes the one of the 
reasons motivating Fernwood's decision to become a Model C school by referencing the words 
9 John Pampallis, "Restructuring the Education System," Democratic Governance of Public Schooling in South 
Africa. (Natal: Education Policy Unit, 1994), 86 . 
10 John Pampallis, "School Ownership in South Africa," Democratic Governance of Public Schooling in South 
Africa. (Natal: Education Policy Unit, 1994), 23 . 
11 Nadine Dolby, Constructing Race Youth, Identity, and Popular Culture in South Africa (New York: State 
University ofNew York Press, 2001), 33. 
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of Fernwood's SGB chair: "If we go Model C we've got control and we just up the school fees 
and we will only take the nice blacks." 12 Under Model C, parents were in a powerful financial 
gate-keeping position, which allowed them to prevent a mass learner migration to their children's 
schools through the adjustment of school fees. In the negotiations over post-apartheid education, 
white constituents would remain committed to SGBs' power to set school fees. The NP's 
unilateral restructuring began the decentralization process and marked the first instance of 
government incorporation of market based approaches to the financing of public education. 
CODESA and the 'Selling' of School Fees to the Democratic Movement 
Once it became clear that apartheid was no longer sustainable, the NP began assembling 
policy alternatives to build upon the newly established Model C framework. Describing the 
NP's response toward the end of apartheid, Pampallis notes, "The National Party has been busy 
putting together new policies which it hopes it will be able to sell to the liberation movement, but 
which will effectively result in the maintenance of white privilege." One such policy alternative 
was the creation of SGBs and the provision of financial responsibilities to these local 
organizations. 
But even the negotiation process was a strategic opportunity for the NP to shift the 
majority's support in favor of their policy recommendations. Nzimande (1993) argues that the 
NP used the CODESA negotiation process to divide the ANC from the democratic movement. 
Having struggled for decades against closed-door negotiations, advocates of People's Education 
argued for talks to take place "on the ground" as opposed to "around the table." 13 Describing the 
concerns of the People's Education movement, Nizmande writes, 
The constitutional negotiations at the moment are largely about creating formal structures of 
representative democracy. Important as this may be, there is a grave danger that the debate around the 
struggles to build and institutionalize participatory democracy may be lost. It is within this 
framework, for instance, that the issue of the role and location of PTSAs/PT As should be 
approached.14 
The CODESA agreements managed to link black fears to white aspirations by strengthening the 
movement's support for local governing bodies. While the ANC recognized how local control 
12 Ibid, 35. 
13 Blade Nizmande, '"Civil Society ' and the Role of the National Education Coordinating Committee," Democratic 
Governance of Public Schooling in South Africa (Natal: Education Policy Unit, 1994), 69. 
14 Ibid, 70. 
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over education could entrench apartheid divisions and inequalities, the majority became 
increasingly committed to a decentralized system of educational governance. Pampallis (1998) 
compares the ironic merging of interests between the NP and the mass movement as, "a 
coincidence of the interests of the two most powerful, if usually antagonistic, constituencies." 15 
With the social and political climate treading in its favor, the NP began its attempt to sell its 
version of post-apartheid education. 
Based on the historic role of Parent Teacher Student Associations (PTSAs), selling the 
idea of school governing bodies was not difficult. During the resistance struggle, the National 
Education Crisis Committee (NECC) established PTSAs in order to coordinate parent and 
student protests. 16 PTSAs gained widespread support and were lauded for their ability to wrest 
control from the state. 17 Sithole (1994) argues that the masses' support for PTSAs stems from a 
widespread "fear of victimization." 18 Unlike the distant, centrally controlled Bantu Education 
system, PTSAs were local, transparent organizations that looked to include the people's voices 
rather than exclude them. Embodying the mass movement's support for PTSAs, Nzimande 
notes, "The only way to guarantee a thoroughgoing transformation is to develop organs of 
people's power now." 19 Selling the idea of SGBs blended well with the democratic movement's 
support for PTSAs. 
While the merging of the black PTSAs and white SGBs of the Model C system satisfied 
both the ANC and the NP, debate over the particular roles and responsibilities of the SGBs were 
difficult to harmonize. In particular, conflict between the ANC and NP centered on the issue of 
school fees. In order to convince the ANC and the democratic movement that SGBs should be 
granted the power to set school fees, the NP relied on three arguments: 1) there was a need for 
supplementary funds to accommodate the massive influx of black learners, 2) allowing white 
schools to set school fees would "free up public funds" and allow the government to focus its 
15 John Pampallis , "Decentralization in the new Education System: Governance and Funding of Schooling in South 
Africa 1992-1997 ," Democratic Governance of Public Schooling in South Africa (Natal : Education Policy Unit, 
1994), 168. 
16 Tsakani Chaka, "School Governance," Issues in Education Policy 2 (Bloemfontein : Centre for Education Policy 
Development, 2008): 9. 
17 Jenni Karlsson and John Pampallis, "The Role of Governance Structures in the Sustainability of Learning 
Spaces." Democratic Governance of Public Schooling in South Africa (Natal: Education Policy Unit, 1994) 132. 
18 Sithole, 46. 
19 Nzimande, 68 . 
resources on those schools with the greatest need, 3) and school fees would prevent another 
bifurcated education system by retaining policy makers' support within the public domain.20 
In the first instance, the Hunter Committee estimated that the education budget would 
double from R25.6 billion to R62.4 billion if school fees were not introduced. 21 In addition, 
supplementary funds from the private sector would allow the government to channel its 
resources to the rural and township schools. Concerning the flight of influential policymakers 
and professionals from public schools, the second White Paper on education argues that failing 
to allow SGBs to set school fees would make it impossible for the government to maintain the 
quality of former white schools. This in turn would cause professionals to move their children 
into private institutions, resulting in a bifurcated education system resembling that of the 
apartheid past. Though the ANC acknowledged the arguments presented by the NP, the 
movement's lifelong commitment to 'free education for all' made accepting school fees a 
difficult task.22 And as stated earlier, the ANC recognized how SGB control over school fees 
would inhibit integration efforts by creating a loophole in the non-racial admissions policy. 
Negotiations over school fees would continue until 1996. 
The South African Schools Act-Successes and Failures of School Fee Implementation 
Although initially opposed to school fees, the ANC eventually conceded to the NP's 
demands. In 1996 the government passed the South African Schools Act, which remains the 
most fundamental piece of legislation on post-apartheid education.23 Included in the Act is the 
stipulation for SGB membership and their particular roles and responsibilities in school 
governance. Under SASA, SGBs must include a parent majority with representation from the 
principal, teachers, staff, and learners. In addition to membership stipulations, SASA outlines 
the responsibilities of SGBs, which include: adopting a constitution and mission statement, 
determining admission policy, overseeing school property, recommending the appointment of 
2
° Fiske and Ladd, 64 . 
30 
21 John Pampallis, "School Fees," Issues in Education Policy 3 (Bloemfontein: Centre for Education Policy 
Development, 2008): 10. This dramatic increase in public expenditure for education provides insight into the 
deplorable, "gutter education" previous ly allotted to the black majority (i.e . assuming that per-student spending is an 
adequate assessment of education quality, the massive hike in required education increases is telling of the quality of 
education under apa1the id). 
22 Ibid., 8. 
23 Ibid. 
teaching staff to the Department of Education, and developing a budget for the school, which 
may include school fees. 24 
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Pampallis ' s "School Fees" provides a general overview of the successes and failures of 
SASA. Perhaps the greatest success resulting from the Act was the integration of black urban 
learners into former white schools. Describing the new multiracial Model C schools, Pampallis 
remarks, "They have absorbed children of the emerging black middle class (African, coloured 
and Indian), as well as a limited number of poorer black families. "25 Supporting Pampallis' s 
' 
observation, Karlsson' s case study of former Model C schools in Durban identifies a similar 
increase in the emollment of middle class applicants irrespective of the learners' race. 26 Another 
success of SASA has been its ability to retain the support of the professional class. Since SASA 
allows SGBs to set school fees, former white schools have continued to offer quality education, 
which has prevented the flight of professionals from the public school system. Thus, 
independent schools account for less than 5% of all South African learners. 27 
But while former Model C schools have continued to thrive under SASA, the vast 
majority of black township and rural schools have remained severely impoverished. Consistent 
with Pampallis and Karlsson's observations, Tikly and Mabogoane (1997) observe that the 
provision of school fees has benefitted only a small minority of urban middle class black 
learners, while ignoring the majority of disadvantaged learners. The authors observe that the 
effectiveness of SGBs is dependent on the wealth and social capital of the surrounding 
community. As a result, SGBs in poorer areas have lacked the capacity of SGBs in more 
affluent areas, deepening the divide between former white and former black public schools.28 
Recent amendments to SASA like the Norms and Standards for School Funding (NSSF) 
attempt to address SGB inefficiencies in poorer communities. Under the NSSF, the poorest 20% 
of schools receive the highest level of government support.29 Despite the government's renewed 
focus on poorer schools, the overall quality in these schools has not improved.30 As a result of 
24 Dieltiens et al. , 14. 
25 Pampallis, "School Fees," 13. 
26Jenni Karlsson, "The Role of Democratic Governing Bodies in South African Schools," Comparative Education 
38 (2002): 333 . 
27 Pampallis, "School Fees," 14. 
28 Leon Tikley and Thabo Mabogoane, "Marketisation as a Strategy for Desegregation and Redress: the Case of 
Historically White Schools in South Africa," International Review of Education 43 (1997) : 160. 
29 Pampallis, "School Fees," 12. 
30 Ibid, 14. 
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minimal government support, 98% of schools in poor township and rural areas charge school 
fees despite their inability to collect these payments. 31 Since the introduction of school fees has 
placed the burden of funding education on SGBs, local community members are forced to 
demand payment from parents in order to maintain school operations.32 A recent study by the 
Nelson Mandela Foundation observes SGB members have resorted to physical violence and 
humiliation tactics to acquire school fee payments.33 In addition, Pampallis argues that since 
attaining funds from the central government is often a difficult and lengthy process, SGBs turn to 
local parents to address their financial needs. While targeting these "softer targets" is a faster 
and more reliable method, it has fragmented parent participation and local community 
involvement. 34 
Complicating the financial challenges of poorer families is the fact that SASA does not 
legally bind SGBs to inform parents of their exemption status. Since it is in the best interest of 
the school to collect a high percentage of fees from the community, SGBs have avoided 
disclosing information concerning qualification for exemption status. As a result, even in areas 
of absolute poverty, fee exemptions are not often used.35 In addition to withholding information 
from parents, SGBs have used screening tests and application fees to exclude learners who may 
be unable to meet the cost of fees at a particular school.36 Moreover, the exemption requirements 
enumerated in SASA rarely apply to the vast majority of poorer families. Under SASA, a 
family's annual income must be less than ten times the cost of school fees in order for the family 
to gain at least partial exemption. Based on the high threshold under SASA, exemption applies 
primarily to poor families who send their children to wealthier schools, not the vast majority of 
poor families sending their children to poor schools. 37 Even if parents understood the 
requirements for exemption, very few parents, including those living in extreme poverty, would 
qualify for school fee exemption. 
3 1 Ib id. 
32 Die ltiens et al., 21 . 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Fiske and Ladd, 70. 
36 Pampallis, "School Fees," 17. 
37 For instance, school fees in poorer areas average R l OO. Parents would only be exempt from paying fees if their 
annual income was less than RI ,000 I year, but any fami ly receiving social grants is already above this income 
bracket. 
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Returning to the Ideals of People's Education 
Although the People's Education movement has seen their dreams of "local organs for 
peoples power" become a reality, the NP's unilateral restructuring and the attachment of school 
fees to SGBs has undermined the efficacy of these local democratic institutions. Although SGBs 
were designed to serve as inclusive platforms for local decision-making, their financing role has 
transformed them into school-fee collecting business centers. Pampallis (1998) describes the 
ironic result of South Africa's shift to a market based decentralize educational system: 
The irony is that the very decentralization that has led to greater democratization of schooling by 
giving all the main stakeholders a powerful voice in the schools' affairs, is also contributing to the 
perpetuation of inequities among our schools. The new inequalities, however, are increasingly being 
drawn on class rather than racial lines. 38 
Pampallis is right to observe the increasing importance of class instead of race in determining 
access to education. The devolution of financial powers to local SGBs has inhibited integration 
by framing access as a matter of income and wealth. Rich schools have maintained their quality, 
while poor schools are unable to extract even marginal fees from the poor communities they 
serve. On the other hand, Pampallis suggests that the increase in decentralization is consistent 
with an increase in democratization. But Pampallis ' s observation assumes that having the legal 
right to a 'powerful voice' is equivalent to one's ability to exercise a ' powerful voice.' Although 
SASA stipulates the creation of SGBs, the Act does not automatically result in local 
communities' immediate and effective use of these new democratic platforms. The data drawn 
from Fiske and Ladd, Karlsson, Tikley and Moboagane suggest that the voices of local 
communities remain unheard to a great extent. In addition to the conclusions these authors draw, 
the data produced by the Nelson Mandela Foundation explains how the introduction of school 
fees has undermined the principle of inclusivity in access to public education, which the People's 
Education movement sought to establish. 
Returning to Pampallis ' s discussion on the introduction of school fees, he notes, 
"Although school fees need not be part of a self-governing package, they were seen as a way of 
giving local governing bodies both discretionary funds and a major incentive to use funds 
wisely."39 School fees are viewed as an effective market incentive in increasing efficiency and 
competition among schools. According to Chaka, the considerable pressure on SGBs to fund 
38 Pampallis, "Decentralization in the New Education System," 170. 
39 Fiske and Ladd , 64. 
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schools explains why SGBs are more concerned about fundraising and financial matters and less 
concerned with educational issues.40 The use of market mechanisms in the distribution of 
education has extended economic inequalities to the educational sphere. 
Unique Aspects of South Africa's Decentralization of Education 
In describing the negotiations on education policy that took place after the fall of 
apartheid, we have seen how South Africa's unique history motivated a push for decentralization 
that was unique in many respects to that of other developing nations. Unlike the international 
data that identifies central government's willingness to shirk responsibility for funding education 
and, the ANC exhibited a tremendous willingness to assume responsibility for funding post-
apartheid education. Simeon and Murray (2001) note that the ANC advocated a strong, non-
racial, unitary state and feared that educational decentralization would give rise to a form of neo-
apartheid. The authors also suggest that the ANC feared that local control over education policy 
would allow for the perpetuation of cultural-specific education that would inhibit racial redress 
and national unity.41 
To clarify the unique motivations explaining South Africa's decentralization of education 
it is helpful to draw upon Kathleen O'Neill ' s Decentralizing the State . In her research on 
decentralization in Latin America, O'Neill discovered that parties favor decentralization when 
the future prospects for maintaining power are unfavorable . For unpopular governments, the 
biggest gamble is maintaining a highly centralized state when an upcoming election may exclude 
one's party from the political process.42 For O'Neill, decentralization is a political maneuver 
where parties engage in a less attractive power sharing while in control of the state, in order to 
secure footholds at sub-national levels in future elections. O'Neill ' s central argument is thus, 
"Parties give today in order to receive tomorrow."43 
Using O'Neill's political interpretation of decentralization, we can better understand the 
factors driving educational decentralization in South Africa. Since no decision occurs in a 
political vacuum and education policy and societal values are closely intertwined, the decision to 
decentralize education had certain costs and benefits associated with each unique cultural group 
4
° Chaka, 26 . 
4 1 Richard Simeon and Christina Murray, "Multi-Sphere Governance in South Africa: An Interim Assessment," 
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42 Kathleen O'Neill , Decentralizing the State. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 5. 
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in South Africa. If we recall Weiler ' s observation that education is the "principle means through 
which values and norms are passed between generations,"44 it is not surprising that the NP 
supported local control over schools as a means to perpetuate Afrikaner culture (not excluding a 
similar support for other powerful sub-national entities like the Zulu in Kwa-Zulu Natal) . 
Like the authoritarian regimes in Latin America, the NP faced an inevitable future of 
power-sharing and looked to protect both their political and ethnic interests. Giliomee (1995) 
observes that the primary motivation for decentralization in South Africa came from the NP, who 
looked to reserve their seat in the post-apartheid governance structure. De Klerk' s decision to 
relinquish power and shift toward a decentralized post-apartheid structure was motivated by a 
desire to preserve Afrikaner culture and political interests, or what O'Neill might refer to as 
"securing long-term horizons."45 De Klerk described the crossroads that lay ahead of the NP: 
"The greatest risk that we are taking today is not taking any risks. The will to survive as 
Afrikaners and our faith and energy will serve as our greatest guarantee."46 Decentralization 
offered the NP a framework through which white power could be secured at sub-national levels 
of government. The "risk" of compromising with the ANC was less of a gamble then trying to 
hold onto a waning, illegitimate power. 
It is not a stretch to apply O'Neill's logic to educational decentralization, as schools were 
one of the historic means through which the NP disseminated Afrikaner values and suppressed 
those of other cultural groups. Likewise, the AN C's support of a centralized education system is 
consistent with O'Neill ' s research since the ANC did not foresee a future where its strength 
would be threatened. With such overwhelming national support, central control over education 
policy presented an opportunity for the ANC to promote a national education policy, not locally 
specific educational agendas. 
Taking a less critical approach to analyzing the motivations for educational 
decentralization in South Africa, one cannot deny that a degree of decentralization may have 
been required. South Africa is, as Schwella (2001) describes, "a world in one country."47 
Desmond Tutu famously called South Africa the "rainbow nation" glorifying the many distinct 
cultural traditions and languages in South Africa. Adding to the mix of cultural variation, the 
44 Weiler, 440 . 
45 O'Neill , 65 . 
46 Giliomee, 86-87. 
47 Erwin Schwella, "Public Sector Policy in the New South Africa: A Critical Review." Public Performance and 
Management Review 24 (2001 ): 367. 
36 
legacy of apartheid created a context where local needs varied drastically between municipalities 
and even within local districts . While the ANC recognized the need to tailor education policy to 
meet local needs, they believed that the central state was the only government entity with 
sufficient strength and resources to deliver important social services like education, health, 
housing, and welfare.48 A fact most likely derived from the ANC's Marxist origins. 
But educational decentralization does not require fiscal decentralization. It is this key 
addition of school fees to SASA that has forestalled educational redress . The fact that race is 
intimately connected with socioeconomic status has made economic liberalization the new 
divisive factor. The application of market principles to education has stratified educational 
opportunity along economic lines and made SGBs meaningless platforms for citizens to voice 
their needs. Simeon and Murray describe the contradictory effects of educational 
decentralization by remarking that "formal democracy" has been created at the expense of a 
genuine "participatory democracy. "49 
For the purposes of our present inquiry however, we must return to our initial focus on 
the norms guiding education in the decentralized market. The literature identifies the failures of 
marketisation as a tool for redress. But the goal of my research is to extend this critique by 
assessing school fee policy from an ethical standpoint. In other words, does the market operate 
to the disadvantage of all learners across the racial and economic spectrum by corrupting social 
norms required for democracy? The next section describes the preliminary steps prior to my field 
research in which I attempted to apply the ethical concerns related by Anderson, Ranson, and 
Strain, to a case study of a public school in South Durban. 
48 Simeon and Murray, 68 . 
49 Ibid., 89. 
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4. Research Logistics 
To restate the goal of my field research, it is to answer Anderson' s second question: do 
market norms evidence themselves in the South African school system and do these norms 
corrupt important social values? Providing an answer to this preliminary question can help us 
achieve our ultimate goal in understanding the relationship between educational decentralization 
and its implications for genuine democracy. This section refines my general research question in 
terms of Anderson ' s framework and then describes the reasons why Durban Academy was 
selected. Moreover, since recent developments in education policy are rooted in the apartheid 
past, I briefly touch upon the school's history and transition to a multicultural school in order to 
provide insight into the underlying motivations of the Durban Academy staff. Included in this 
section is a description of the methodologies used and their accompanying limitations. 
Research Aims 
Since the goal is to determine whether market norms guide Durban Academy's and the 
school community' s understanding of education, I framed Anderson's five economic norms in 
relation to my specific education focus. Arriving at appropriate ' community' -based questions 
simplified the field research phase by serving as a guide throughout the study. The table cross-
lists the specific community type with the specific market norm under investigation (see next 
page). 
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Figure 4.1 
Operationalizing Anderson's Market Norms 
School as Educational-Producer 
Market Norms Parents & Students as 
A. SGB B. Teachers Education Consumers 
1. Impersonal How does the SGB deal with Do teachers discriminate How do parents respond to 
non-fee paying parents? between fee-paying and non- SGB school fee requests? 
fee paying learners? 
2. Egoistic Does SGB prioritize collection Do teachers prioritize higher Are parents focused solely 
of school fees over parents' school fees over inclusive on their own chi ld's 
well-being? admissions? development? 
3. Exclusive Is SGB school fee policy - -
exclusive? 
4. Want-based Does SGB satisfy needs of Do teachers respond to student Does a parents' ability to 
poorer learners? needs regardless of ability to pay determine their chi ld's 
pay? access to school? 
5. Exit > Voice Does SGB provide a Do teachers express a desire to Assess parent participation 
meaningful platform for leave DA for a better school? and student decisions to 
parents' exercise of voice? enter/exit DA. 
For sake of clarity, the three communities were identified by the particular role in school 
operations and their relation to the two other communities. The available respondents for 
research presented an immediate conflict with Anderson's framework, as the producers in the 
market equation are not a homogenous body, but comprise of two sub-communities: the SGB 
and the teachers. A new element of my research would have to consider the way these two 
groups interacted and the power-politics at play within the school-as-educational producer 
model. An additional complication arose when considering the role of the principal, who in this 
case, headed SGB meetings, but also taught two history classes. Based on the principal's 
important role in the overall management of the school, his responses were categorized under the 
SGB community (though his responses were not reviewed as exclusively one community or 
another). Answering Anderson's second question thus required a flexible framework that would 
need to consider the multiple actors charged with running overall school operations. 
On the 'consuming' end of the education market are the parents and students. They are 
best characterized as ' consumers,' since they are required to pay a user fee in order to receive an 
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educational service. 1 Labeling the communities assisted in the organization of data and in the 
construction of a holistic argument that related the challenges each community faces individually 
and in relation to the other communities.2 
In addition, by evaluating the data through Anderson's ethical lens, I recognized that each 
community was only capable of exercising market norms in virtue of their particular role in 
relation to the other two communities. For instance, the power to exclude was not invested in the 
teachers or parent communities, but in the governing body, while the ability to exit was reserved 
to teacher and parent/learner communities. Understanding the broad structure of my argument, I 
searched for a school that would provide access to these three communities. 
Selecting a School-Durban Academy 
Durban Academy is a secondary school located in the working-class Bluff community. 
The school was founded in 1957 under the name, Dirkie Uys, in commemoration of the fifteen 
year-old Voortrekker hero who died protecting his father in the Battle of Italeni.3 For forty-years 
the school carried a strong Afrikaner tradition. In 1997, the school became a dual medium 
Afrikaans-English school, which marked an initial step toward integration. Under pressure from 
the SGB, the school changed its name to Durban Academy I Akademie on the 1st of April 1997. 
Today, the school website states, "The staff and students reflect the rainbow nation."4 
In addition to the political pressure to integrate Model C schools, the declining numbers 
of Afrikaner students fueled Durban Academy's transition in becoming a multiracial parallel 
school. By 1997, the school enrollment leveled off at around 400 students due to the 'white 
flight' from navy, air force, army, and railway personnel whose children comprised the majority 
of enrollees at Durban Academy. As one respondent explained, "The survival of the school 
depends on the learners .. . and what good is a school without students." The added pressure to 
maintain enough students in order to continue employing the teaching staff resulted in the 
1 The identifying labels were drawn from Strain's discussion on school competition and parent consumers (For more 
information see Strain (! 995), 5. See also, Sayed ( 1997), 351. 
2 These labels were not used in any way during the data collection phase in order to prevent respondents from 
supporting the Anderson framework . Labels were used purely as a way to organize research post-data collection . 
3 The South African Military History Society, "The Battle of Italeni." Military History Journal 4. 
<http: //samiIitaryhistory.org/vol045 is. htm I.> 
4 Durban Academy Homepage <http://www.dbnacademy.co.za/index.html> 
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school ' s decision to become a dual-medium school. DA officials chose not to amalgamate with 
Port Natal, an Afrikaans school in Pinetown. 
Although respondents praised the school ' s transition to a dual-medium school, 
preliminary interview data revealed mixed explanations on the motivations behind Durban 
Academy's decision to integrate. While respondents argued that the former principal had the 
vision to open enrollment to black township learners, the former principal himself described the 
transition process as a "numbers game." Another respondent who participated in the decision-
making process during the transition phase explained, "Our problem started when the availability 
of space in the school got too big. So we had to take in and fill up to keep the teachers. There 
was just no way to keep that school Afrikaans and survive." In addition to Durban Academy's 
genuine goal to integrate, the data suggests that the external political pressures and the internal 
' numbers game ' required Durban Academy to open access to non-Afrikaans speaking learners. 
But to discount Durban Academy' s management as bitter-enders opposed to the 
integration process would be to overlook the courageous steps the staff took in defying the 
culturally conservative Bluff community. One respondent described the social climate 
immediately following Durban Academy' s decision to integrate by remarking, "All those people 
that are struggling now at that time wanted to crucify us. They would say, ' How can you do it? 
How can you do that?" ' Other respondents related enduring feelings of resentment towards 
Durban Academy as a school that "sold out to the black community." Regardless of the motives 
behind Durban Academy's decision to integrate, its current student body is indeed reflective of 
the rainbow nation with a majority of learners commuting from the surrounding black townships. 
The history behind Durban Academy' s transition to a multicultural school is important in 
imagining how education is perceived from the respondents and helped to locate their positions 
on race and integration in terms of a larger, historical process. Though my research focuses on 
the concerning effects of market valuations that ignore references to race, since economic status 
and race are closely connected in the South African context, understanding one without the other 
would fail to provide a complete picture of the South Africa's education market. 
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5. Findings 
As indicated by Figure 4.1, research findings are organized by community as opposed to 
the market norm under question. Explaining Anderson's notion of sphere differentiation 
becomes clearer when arranging the argument by community type. Under each community are 
subheadings corresponding to the particular market norm under investigation. We begin with an 
assessment of the SGB community. 
Community !A-Market Norms in the 'Cost and Budgeting' SGB 
Since SASA places the onus of school financing on SGBs, one would expect Durban 
Academy's SGB to demonstrate each of Anderson's five norms. Based on interview data, the 
SGB community demonstrated mixed valuations of education consistent with both market and 
nonmarket norms. Though the SGB community was neither exclusive nor want-regarding, the 
inclusive admission policy required the SGB to adopt an impersonal and businesslike approach 
in dealing with non-fee paying parents. The practices of blacklisting and the "offer system" were 
used to compensate for the lack of funds received from township learners. Thus a local platform 
for community voices was transformed into an impersonal cost-budgeting center. 
Meeting the Needs of the Wider Community-SGB Admissions Policy 
Based on Durban Academy's diverse student body, one immediately recognizes the 
inclusive admissions policy set by the SGB. In contrast to other former Model C schools, 
Durban Academy works to set school fees at a level that best approximates the wealth of the 
enrollees. Principal van Rooijen described the makeup of Durban Academy students and the 
challenges that inclusive admissions policies often bring: 
Money wise we have problems. We don't serve an affluent community. We serve people from all 
over the board. You know from rural areas from townships, which means you can only get so much 
money and you have to live with that. 
By prioritizing the needs of poorer learners over financial efficiency, Durban Academy has 
defied the norms of typical market producers. But Durban Academy has done more than simply 
survive the challenges of integration and has raised a new standard of acceptance that even the 
neighboring middle-class Grosvenor schools have not been able to meet. Describing Durban 
Academy's inclusive admissions policy, one parent remarked, "Durban Academy will take the 
kid no other school will take." 
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Accepting non-fee payers has come at an expensive cost however, by upsetting Durban 
Academy' s more elite and conservative support base. The former principal remarked that during 
the transition phase, even long-term faculty grew increasingly upset with his decision to admit 
poorer black learners. Notice the sincere devotion to including disadvantaged learners expressed 
in the former principal ' s discussion on whether to exclude township learners: 
But where does he go? Where is he going to get a chance in life? We always said, 'give him a 
chance, give him an opportunity.' Because it is like closing a door, if that door is closed and you can't 
come in, and there is no opportunity elsewhere, where do you go? Where do you go? Because at 
other schools, they won ' t even take him. If we can ' t change them, then nobody will. 
The principal's closing remark suggests that it was not only a learner's inability to pay school 
fees, but the undisciplined behavior that sparked resentment toward a more inclusive admissions 
policy. This observation identifies the courage required by Durban Academy to include 
township learners. 
In tandem with the SGB's inclusive admissions policy is the exercise of the need-
regarding norm. Discussion on school fees reflected a similar commitment to maintaining 
admissions costs that included disadvantaged learners. Again adopting an inclusive approach, 
Principal van Rooijen remarked, "There are suggestions of putting it up a lot, but it ' s unfair." 
While some schools prioritize quality concerns over fairness, Principal van Rooijen has opted 
instead to sacrifice quality gains for a more diverse student body. Once again, Durban 
Academy's needs-based approach is even more admirable when considering the mounting 
opposition the SGB faced during the transition process. One SGB member described the wider 
community's perception of Durban Academy's school fees: "So many parents and even the 
teachers are on our backs because our school fees are so low. I'll say about 50% of our school 
children come from Umlazi because our school fees are so low." 1 Due to a lack of quality 
education in the townships and the higher cost of school fees at the neighboring Grosvenor Boys 
and Grosvenor Girls, township learners flock to Durban Academy. In comparison to the nearby 
Grosvenor schools enrollment, which averages 600 learners, Durban Academy has a student 
1 Umlazi is a black township located southwest of the Bluff. 
enrollment of 800 learners with school fees priced at around R2000 less than the Grosvenor 
schools. 
Why Market Norms Come into Play-the Demands Placed on SGBs 
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While Durban Academy has committed itself to addressing the needs of township 
learners, accommodating students from poorer families has come at a heavy cost by increasing 
the financial burden on its SGB and finance committee. According to the SGB secretary, only 
40% of learners pay school fees. 2 In order to offset the majority oflearners who attend Durban 
Academy, the SGB is forced to adopt a strict, businesslike approach to retaining funds. Since the 
school's survival depends on the effectiveness of the SGB to collect school fees, it is without 
surprise that interviews with SGB members revealed an impersonal and egoistic approach in 
handling non-fee paying parents. The methods of blacklisting and the "offer system" are two 
means that have been adopted by the SGB community in order to ensure the school's survival. 
What was initially referred to as "the cycle" was later identified as the blacklisting 
process. Blacklisting involves removing the ability of non-fee paying parents to receive a future 
loan. According to the school's bursar, 95% of non-fee paying parents are blacklisted. Section 
41 of SASA stipulates, "The governing body of a public school may by process of law enforce 
the payment of school fees by parents who are liable to pay in §40."3 Section 40 outlines 
exemption status for eligible parents. If a parent is not exempt from paying school fees and 
refuses to pay, the SGB begins blacklisting parents through affiliated private debt collectors. 
The school's bursar estimates that "old school fees," which are funds obtained through 
blacklisting parents five to ten years after their child has matriculated, account for approximately 
R60,000 of the school's annual budget. 
While blacklisting is an efficient and arguably necessary means for Durban Academy to 
retain sufficient funds to maintain school operations, it is a practice dominated by impersonal 
and egoistic norms. When asked if blacklisted parents ever approached the SGB, one SOB 
member replied, 
They sometimes do. But the thing is you don't take them off that. Because as soon as you break that 
2 The percentage is a rough estimate calculated by adding the sum total of school fee payments and divided by the 
total number of learners. Thus, more than 40% of learners are likely paying, but not at the total cost of school fees 
(i.e. I 00% of learners could be paying, but at a rate subsidized by 60%) . 
3 
"No. 84 of 1996: South African Schools Act." (1996), Ch. 4, §36. 
cycle, you have to restart the cycle. So if he doesn't pay, the debt collector will come knocking on 
his door. 
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For this SGB member, the need to collect school fees forces him to prioritize financial needs 
over parent concerns. Instead of cooperating with parents and working to accommodate their 
specific issues in a personable manner, the SGB must adopt an iron fa<;ade to ensure the school's 
survival. It is what one SGB member described as, "running a tight ship." 
An exact figure of the number of parents who are blacklisted each year was not 
discovered, but when asked how many parents were handed over to the debt collectors each year, 
the finance secretary replied, "A lot, a lot. I can't even think. We hand over every year." The 
demands placed on SGB members demands a stringent approach to working with non-fee paying 
parents. Again describing the inability of the SGB to make exceptions, one member replied, "A 
lot of people will phone us and say, 'Hey I want to borrow money, but I'm blacklisted.' 'Pay, 
pay, pay your accounts! We can't take them off until they've paid." 
But particularly troubling to the blacklisting process is the mixing of private interests in 
the funding of schools. Durban Academy's relationship with a private debt collecting company 
is best explained in the words of one SGB member: 
We need that money, so if people don't pay our school fees then Ms. __ jacks them up and says 
listen, 'Why didn't you pay your school fees.' Once we can't get it out of her then we just hand it over 
to debt collectors. But obviously we also pay for the debt collectors. Any money we collect, we have 
to pay them 20%. They are helping us, but we are helping them as well. That's their job .. . they just 
collect money all the time. So when we hand over, they try to get as much as they can from us 
because it means money for them. 
Let us consider first the demands placed on the SGB. The opening line, "We need that money," 
relates the difficult task burdened upon SGB members to collect school fees . Since an inefficient 
SGB equates to a poorly funded school, and a poorly funded school is often (though not always) 
a poor quality school, each SGB member is forced to approach non-fee paying parents from a 
business perspective. In the interviews conducted with the SGB community, each member 
related an understanding of their important role in sustaining school operations. Let us consider 
next the mixing of private interests. If a company's profitability is dependent on blacklisting 
parents, then private debt collectors' chief incentive is to maintain a large pool of non-fee paying 
parents. Instead of working to decrease the number of blacklisted parents, private companies 
like Durban Academy's debt collectors, incentivize low levels of school fee payment for their 
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personal interests. Thus, funding is complicated by individuals who "just collect money all the 
time." 
In spite of their market approach to dealing with non-fee paying parents, SGB members 
presented a dual personality: on the one hand an impersonal and rigid persona demanded by their 
profession, and on the other, a sincere sense of compassion for those blacklisted parents who 
returned asking for exemption. The finance secretary described her feelings on blacklisting 
parents: 
I'll be quite honest with you, we don't like handing over our parents. But then again, you can help the 
parents so far and no more. And then they have just got to face the consequences after that. There is 
nothing we can do. We've tried to help them. 
SGBs operate within a financial straightjacket, which forbids personal relations and the exercise 
of voice. In a case study of Gauteng SGBs, Dieltiens et al. note a similar observation of the 
burdens placed on SGB members: "For schools serving impoverished communities, the burden 
of establishing, retrieving, and exempting parents from paying fees is particularly onerous. 
SGBs have become cost and budgeting centers."4 As Dieltiens et al. suggest, the cost and 
budgeting requirements of SGBs force SGB members to prioritize a professional role over a 
personal role. 
Two responses from two different SGB members elaborate on Dieltiens et al. ' s 
observation. One SGB member described blacklisting as the most difficult and trying aspect of 
her profession: 
The hardest part is handing people over. We've had people come here crying and saying, ' I can't get 
a loan, I need to pay my debts, but I can't because I' m blacklisted.' So it is very hard when they come 
and say, 'Please take us off the blacklist. ' But you can't do that. You do it for one and you have to do 
it for everyone. 
For this SGB member, it is as if she strives to exercise social norms, but is trapped inside the 
impersonal and egoistic domain of market relations. Similarly, the head of the SGB stressed 
how unfortunate it was to be forced to blacklist parents: "We have to be rigid and it's 
unfortunate. It is so unfortunate really." In running a "tight ship," the SGB is forced to blacklist 
non-fee paying parents in order to keep the institution afloat. 
4 Die ltiens et al., 21. 
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Egoism and the Offer System 
In addition to blacklisting, Durban Academy's SGB is forced to adopt a second 
alternative to ensure a sufficient amount of school fees are retained. What will be referred to as 
the "offer system," concerns a single line attached to the national school fee-exemption form that 
allows Durban Academy to acquire funds from families who are completely exempt from paying 
school fees. This section outlines the exemption process and then provides an analysis of the 
school bursar's role in transforming the offer into a legal statement. In addition, I offer a 
description of the bursar's particular role in school fee policy and contrast his position in the 
education market with Anderson's ethical concerns. 
At the beginning of the year, exemption forms are sent home with the learners and are 
reviewed by the finance secretary. The sooner exemption forms can be administered and 
returned, the earlier the school can begin collecting offers for the school year. In addition to 
providing pay slips and disclosing their entire financial background, parents applying for 
exemption must respond to the question: "If you are not able to pay the full school fees, state the 
amount that you are able to pay." The provision is not apart of the national exemption form, but 
could be considered an extension of SASA's elastic clause as noted in §36: 
A governing body of a public school must take all reasonable measures within its means to 
supplement the resources supplied by the State in order to improve the quality of education provided 
by the schools to all learners at the school [emphasis added). 5 
When the exemption forms are returned, the finance department sends the forms to the school 
bursar who computes a legitimate offer on the basis of the applicant's income. The bursar then 
sends an "acknowledgment of debt agreement" back to the parents with the adjusted offer. Once 
the document is signed, it is an official legal document whereby the school can take parents to 
court if they fail to comply. 
The offer system is guided by impersonal and egoistic market norms. It is impersonal in 
its handling of exempted parents and egoistic in terms of prioritizing the school's financial needs 
over a parent's financially exempt status. The underhanded methods behind the offer system are 
clarified in one SGB member's statement: 
In other words, what happens here is that he doesn't have to pay a cent. But he has offered to pay R50 
per month. We are a little bit cheeky, I'll tell you why. On the form we put there, 'If you are not able 
5 
"No. 84 of 1996: South African Schools Act." (1996), Ch. 4, §36. 
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to pay the full school fees, state the amount that you are able to pay. ' And then we hold them a:gainst 
it. We will accept that offer because they actually don ' t have to pay us a cent. We just try to get 
something out of them. 
This particular SGB member approached exempted parents as a trading partner in a business 
transaction and attempted to maximize profit on behalf of the school. Another SGB member 
described the offer system according to market norms: 
That one line, we put it in because there are a lot of kids that are actually exempt from paying school 
fees. But you think to yourself, 'Why must the others carry them?' If they are prepared to pay R50 a 
month, Jet them pay R50 a month. 
Cooperation is submerged beneath competition, as local governing bodies are forced to fund 
schools and take "all reasonable measures" to supplement state funds. 
But the offer system is not a passive mechanism that asks parents to voluntarily follow 
through on an offered payment. Perhaps the most alarming aspect of the offer system is the way 
legally exempt parents can be legally bound to pay their offered amount. So while a parent may 
be exempt from paying R5720 a year, he/she can be bound to pay whatever amount is offered in 
the exemption form. Describing the conversion of a parent's offer into a legally binding 
document, the school bursar stated, 
It's voluntary, but I turn it into a legal document. They, I didn't, they make the decision. I then drew 
up a legal document, which they signed, so they are committed to that amount. There is no escape 
from that. No escape. 
But how is the offer voluntary if the proposed amount is adjusted to the bursar's computed sum 
of what should constitute an 'appropriate offer'? The SGB's twisted notion of voluntariness 
penalizes exempt parents, but is based once again, on the considerable demands placed on SGBs. 
The rigid impersonality and egoism of the offer system only sinks deeper as the details 
are brought to light. The bursar described the process that takes place if a parent offers more 
than the calculated amount: 
So ifthe offer is more I hold onto the offer. I don't show them that they actually should pay less. 
Because the Schools Act [SASA] allows me to negotiate with parents. So that amount they put in 
there, I assume they ' ve worked out their budget. That is the amount I claim from them in court if they 
don't pay it. 
SASA legalizes SGBs' attempts to legally bind exempted parents to pay an offered amount. 
Interview data identified cases of pensioners who received R800 a month being held legally 
accountable to pay a R150 offer. 
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Business as SASA Dictates-Recap of SGB Community 
In review of Community 1 A, the SGB operates according to a mix of market and 
nonmarket norms. As the blacklisting and offer methods relate, Anderson' s five market norms 
are not mutually exclusive, but often operate in a web ofrelationships. The SGB' s inclusive 
admissions policy demands an impersonality and egoism in the handling of non-fee paying and 
exempted parents. With the obligation of retaining school fees placed on the SGB, market norms 
are required for the successful upkeep of school operations. As one SGB member stated, "You 
know a school is a business. You can't run a school without capital." And if building capital is 
the SGB's responsibility, operating along business norms is a necessary extension of their role. 
Ranson describes the way market systems elicit economic norms in individuals: "The point is not 
that individuals are by nature possessively self-interested, but that the institutions of the market 
make them so."6 The demands that are placed upon SGBs and financial secretaries manifest 
within these financiers, the egoistic and impersonal norms that should have no role in local 
platforms in the running of schools.7 It is the system, not the individuals that needs restructuring. 
The most alarming finding within the SGB was how its role as an inclusive democratic 
organ has been subverted by market norms. Instead of serving as an inviting platform for 
communities to decide collectively on school-related issues, the financial and managerial role of 
the SGB divides the school and the surrounding community. One SGB member related stories of 
parents who refused to answer their cell phones and who changed their SIM cards to avoid calls 
from the SGB. Another SGB member explained that parents often "hop" from school to school 
in order to avoid debt collectors. Finally, one SGB member described the common response 
from parents who are blacklisted by stating, "You try to tell them that it is for the school, but 
they take it personally." The attachment of school fee policy to SGB responsibilities has 
undermined the freedom of SGBs to value education as a public good. Personal interactions 
between SGB members and parents are replaced with exemption forms, which is as one SGB 
member remarked, "[This is] how we get to know the parents." The impersonal and businesslike 
6 Ranson, "Markets or Democracy," 335. 
7 Reference Soobrayan' s account of the People ' s Education Movement ' s emphasis on local contro l, which states 
"people must also participate in its conception, formulation and implementation." 
relations between the SGB and the parent community may account for the low levels of parent 
involvement. 8 
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Considering our market assessment of Durban Academy's SGB, we can estimate how 
finances are handled by SGBs in richer and poorer schools. For former Model C schools still 
offering top-quality education, market norms of exclusion and want-based ideals are likely to 
inform their admissions policies. Quality public schools like Glenwood and Durban High School 
have been criticized for catering solely to the emerging black middle class, while ignoring the 
greater needs of poorer township learners. Though the number of non-fee paying parents may be 
lower in institutes with higher school fees, Durban Academy's SGB members related that 
blacklisting and the offer system were used more readily in these schools. In fact, one SGB 
member described the perspective of non-fee paying parents by remarking, "We heard a lot of 
parents say, 'We send our children here because we reasonable."' If Durban Academy's 
blacklisting and offer methods are considered reasonable, one can only estimate what SGB 
operations may be like in more affluent schools. 
At the other end of the spectrum are the SGBs in poorer schools. Here, we can return to 
Hirschman's understanding of voice and exit as it relates to the effectiveness of local democracy. 
Hirschman identifies a prerequisite for voice by stating, "a customer must expect that he himself 
or other member-customers will be able to marshal some influence or bargaining power."9 For 
members of poorer SGBs, their commitment to school operations is likely plagued by a feeling 
of powerlessness. The wealth of the surrounding community and the limited capacity of SGBs 
place an added burden upon their ability to serve as democratic platforms for school policy 
debate. Moreover, the blacklisting "cycle" requires a minimum of five to ten years of steady 
recordkeeping in order to yield any benefits from "old-school funds." Similarly, the offer system 
is moot without the hiring of a school bursar who can aggressively assess exemption forms, 
transform offers into legal documents, and attend court trials when necessary. One SGB member 
described her perception of finances in poorer schools by remarking, "I don't think they got 
systems that really run. If they have computers, I don't think they know how to run them. You 
can still get away in your cash books, but I don't know I haven't been there." 
8 Discussed further in Community 3, subsection "Commuting Learners-Explaining Low Levels of Parent Voice 
through Leamer Exit." 
9 Hirschman, 41. 
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Though this case study is limited in its scope and knowledge of SOBs in poorer 
communities, the analysis of Durban Academy's SOB identifies the complexity of SOB 
operations-a capacity that may be beyond what SOBs in poorer communities are capable. 
Understanding the ways in which market norms guide SOB operations, the next section assesses 
whether these valuations flow into the teaching community and what impact teachers might have 
on the identity of schools as an educational-producer. 
Community lB: Preserving Social Norms in the Teaching Community 
Although the SOB community demonstrated a reliance on market norms, this preliminary 
finding need not extend to the teaching or student communities. One SOB member mentioned 
the SOB's separation from "in-house" classroom operations stating, "We don't get involved in 
the day to day running of the school. It is not our responsibility." So while the dominance of 
market norms in the SOB community is a concern in and of itself, perhaps its deleterious effects 
are confined to the SOB. But in order to offer a conclusive assessment of teacher valuations of 
education, an assessment of school fees from the teachers' perspective is required to qualify SOB 
observations. Based on data gained from eight teacher interviews, the teaching community 
revealed little to no reliance on market norms. In terms of Anderson's framework, the teachers 
emphasized three social norms: an absence of egoism, prioritizing student needs over better 
resources and smaller class sizes; a personal approach to education that looked to provide 
guidance and support for struggling learners; and finally, exercising voice instead of exit by 
opting to stay at Durban Academy and grapple with the challenges of teaching at a multicultural 
school. 
Prioritizing Student Needs over Teacher Wants 
In the first instance, teachers prioritized student needs over a better resourced school and 
smaller class sizes. While they admitted their preferences for overhead projectors, dry-erase 
boards, new desks, and air-conditioning, only one of the eight teachers recommended an increase 
in school fees to make these changes possible. Egoism, understood as "teacher's wants," was 
placed beneath the students ' needs. One teacher described her preferences in relation to 
wealthier public schools, but acknowledged the feasibility of new resources considering the 
financial status of learners' families: 
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You know it would be nice. If you look at a school like Glenwood, and they pay astronomical 
amounts of school fees and what makes it nice is they have got all the resources of a private school. 
And it would be nice to have it here, but I don't think that the people that enroll here can afford more 
than that actually. 
Teachers were hesitant to raise school fees based on the economic background of a majority of 
their learners. While school fee increases could relieve them of large class sizes and under-
resourced classrooms, teachers were willing to cope with these inconveniences in order to 
accommodate township learners. 
Preserving Personal Relations in the Classroom 
Regarding personal relations within the classroom, teachers expressed a desire to spend 
more time with their learners, but were forced to deal with the practical constraints of large class 
sizes . Personal relations within the teaching community were expressed more as a desire, than 
an actual exercise of personal norms. For the purposes of our study however, teachers' 
motivations and valuations of education are equally important to their actual practices.10 The 
teachers ' personal approach to learners is best captured in one educator' s statement: "Being a 
teacher you can ' t do as much as you would like. You would like to go around and ask each 
child, 'Do you have a problem?' But you don't get the chance to go and do something like that." 
Although time constraints and class size limited teacher-student interactions, these obstacles did 
not undermine educators ' desire to reach through to their learners. 
In addition to teachers ' desire to spend more individual time with learners, they expressed 
a willingness to assume a parenting or social worker role in the learners' lives. Educators 
described the "several roles" of teachers in filling the void in parent guidance, counseling 
students after working hours, and assisting them in future career or job opportunities. Teachers 
were distressed by the inability to assist children in need. One respondent described the most 
difficult part of her job as her inability to counsel students: 
You know, when we had smaller classes, we knew more about the kids. You know, now you could 
see them sitting here, but you wouldn ' t know that they are being abused all the time because you don ' t 
have that kind of knowledge. There are a Jot of kids who need help, but you never know unless they 
come to you. 
10 Th is observation does not discount the presence of personal interactions between teachers and students. 
Stories of student rape victims and suicide attempts were related in teacher interviews. Each 
time these cases were referenced, teachers expressed a longing to assist students and offer 
whatever support or parenting guidance they could provide. 
Opting to Stay-Teachers' Absence of Exit 
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Perhaps the most important social norm concerning teacher valuations of education was 
the teachers' exercise of voice instead of exit. Though the motivations underlying Durban 
Academy's transition to a multiracial school are debatable, educators' reactions to the changes 
revealed a commitment to improving the quality of the school and the lives of the students it 
serves. Principal van Rooijen's description of his own personal challenges teaching in a 
multiracial school reveal his unwillingness to exit: "I think I took about six months to adapt and 
to feel free and happy .. . in the beginning it was hard because I had been teaching so long, for 
so many years in my own language, but everybody learns." Supporting the principal's exercise 
of voice, another teacher remarked, "I am very happy that this school became a multi-racial 
school. And I feel blessed that I teach in a school where there is a cross-section of the 
community. Yes, it is hard at times, but you learn to adapt." While white flight from the 
conservative Bluff community was common in the 1990s, Durban Academy teachers not only 
decided to stay on the Bluff, but chose to continue teaching at an institution undergoing drastic 
changes in student demographics, resources, and school ethos. 
Supporting teachers ' commitment to improving the quality of education at Durban 
Academy is the low salary that they receive. One respondent expressed her frustrations with the 
pay, but then retracted her comment by describing her commitment to teaching: "The salary is 
pathetic. It's peanuts. But we are not working for the money. It is your love for kids that makes 
you stay." The willingness of the staff to grapple with Durban Academy's transition to a dual 
medium school and to devote their time and energy to develop successful learners demonstrates 
the social norm of voice over exit. 
Recap of Teaching Community 
The preservation of social norms in the teaching community correlates with their low 
involvement in financial affairs. One teacher described her involvement with school finance 
issues by remarking, "Not at all. You don't have to be involved with payments and that is nice. 
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If a child doesn ' t pay his school fees, you don' t get involved with that, you don' t even know if 
he is behind on his payments." Each teacher interviewed reflected a similar detachment from 
finance issues, which was consistent with Principal van Rooijen's statement that teachers are 
employed to teach, not to collect school fees. Moreover, teachers who provided assessments of 
school fee statistics were often incorrect, which strengthened the conclusion that teachers are 
separated from school financing issues. 
In terms of identifying Durban Academy's position within South Africa's education 
market, we are forced to ask whether the SGB's or the teaching community' s norms guide the 
overall running of the school. Based on the interview data, it is apparent that teachers defer their 
views of equal education to the SGB. Although teachers exercise non-market norms, they 
recognize the important role of the SGB in collecting school fees. Their inaction of choosing not 
to become involved in school fee operations can be understood as an endorsement of market 
norms. Within the education market then, we can conclude that teachers do not exercise market 
norms and teach their students to the best of their ability. But these social norms exist only 
within the walls of teachers' classrooms and assume secondary importance to SGB needs in the 
overall running of the school. 
The presence of non-market actors within the school-as-educational producer offers a 
more refined understanding of Anderson's notion of sphere differentiation. Here, market and 
non-market actors co-exist and even recognize the important role each plays in school 
operations. It is evident however that the larger pressures of the education market, within which 
Durban Academy operates, causes teachers to defer ultimate decision making power to the 
SGBs. Market norms prevail not out of a clear absence of non-market norms, but as a result of 
practical necessity for what the school needs in order to operate. 
As in the recap of the SGB community, based on our analysis of the social norms in the 
teaching community at Durban Academy, we can postulate the roles of educators in both richer 
and poorer communities. In the first case, since more affluent schools have strong parent 
involvement, powerful governing bodies, and a steady supply of school fees to employ 
additional financial secretaries and governing body educators, teacher involvement with 
financial issues is likely to be even less than at Durban Academy. In addition, additional staff 
members would allow teachers to develop personal relations with students in smaller classes. 
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The "several roles" of teachers would likely decrease to a few specialized roles as educator and 
mentor. 
Teachers in poorer schools are likely to demonstrate the opposite effect. Since poorer 
schools lack the capital to hire additional staff members to manage the school ' s finances, 
teachers will be required to fill this financial responsibility. Complicating matters is the 
capacity of SGBs in poorer areas to fill the void. Chaka observes that teachers are often the 
most vocal members in SGBs due to the incapacity and lack of involvement from the parent 
community. I I So if SGBs are governed by market norms in virtue of their financial roles, and if 
SGBs in poorer areas are predominantly led and sustained by teachers, what values are learners 
in townships and rural areas exposed to within the classroom? The barriers between SGB and 
teacher roles crumbles in poorer schools. In addition to the mixing of market and nonmarket 
norms, large class sizes in poorer schools inhibit teachers' abilities to develop personal student-
teacher relations. 
Returning to the case study of Durban Academy, in order to determine whether regulation 
of South Africa's education market is necessary requires a final analysis of student valuations. 
The aim of the following section can be understood in terms of the preliminary conclusions we 
have made thus far: do the market norms of SGBs (which take precedence over the teaching 
community's reliance on democratic norms) affect parent and student valuations of education? 
Community 2-Parent and Student Consumers 
Parent and student valuations demonstrated a reliance on market norms linked to the 
financial role of the SGB. Due to the wide variation of socioeconomic status within the parent 
community further differentiation was required. For instance, for black township families , exit 
equates to entrance into Durban Academy, whereas for wealthier Bluff families, exit means 
leaving Durban Academy and enrolling in alternative public schools or elite private schools. In 
both cases however, the learners suffer by means of long distance commutes and limited 
interaction with learners of different socioeconomic backgrounds. But the massive learner 
migration has had a detrimental impact on parents ' voice as well. For black township parents, 
voice is constrained by public transportation limitations. Learner exit also draws concerns 
between Bluff parent's freedom and their children ' s autonomy. In the post-apartheid education 
11 Chaka, 27. 
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market, parents are capable of exercising exit and enrolling their child in a school reflective of 
their particular values, thus filtering the types of knowledge that is transmitted to their child. The 
first two subsections entitled, "Township Exit" and "Explaining Low Levels of Parent Voice 
through Learner Exit" focus primarily on the poorer, black commuting group of learners. The 
following two subsections entitled, "Want Based Explanations for Low Parent Involvement" and 
"Egoism, Exit, and Parent Socialization" are more specific to the affluent, white, non-commuting 
parent/learner community. 
Township Exit and the Selection of Durban Academy 
While much attention has been devoted to the white flight from former Model C schools 
into private institutions, a similar migration of learners has occurred from township and rural 
schools to urban, former Model C schools. Since SASA's provision of school fees has 
maintained the divide in school quality between former black and white schools, parents and 
learners often enroll in the highest quality schools they can afford. For poorer black learners, 
selecting a school in South Africa's education market is a matter of finding an affordable school 
beyond the townships. For poorer learners, exit is directly linked to their parent's wealth. While 
democratic values may be taught in the classroom, these norms are undermined by learners' first-
hand experiences of what money can buy (see graph on next page). 
Figure 3.2 
'Township School in the Suburbs': Geographic Breakdown of 
Durban Academy Learners 
D Commuting Learners* •Non-Commuting Learners** 
The title, "Township School in the Suburbs" taken from Chisholm (2008). 
*Commuting Learners include those learners residing in: Umlazi, Lamontville, KwaMashu, Isipingo, Mobeni 
Heights, Newlands, Austerville, Clairwood, Woodlands, Sea View, Wentworth, and Merewent. 
**Non-Commuting Learners inc lude those learners from: Bluff, Brighton Beach, Fynnlands, Ocean View, 
Marlboroug, and Grosvenor. 
Dividing learners into "Commuting" and "Non-Commuting" camps is subject to interpretation. While subjective 
limitations are acknowledged, researcher ' s break-down oflearners was drawn from interview data and cross-
checked with approval of SGB members to determine an appropriate boundary between "Non-Commuting" and 
"Commuting" learners. 
56 
Figure 3.2 above identifies the mass-learner migration occurring at Durban Academy. Of 
the 798 enrollees, 544 (68%) commute from townships located off the Bluff. Only 254 learners 
(32%) reside on the Bluff. The most common explanation interviewees provided for the massive 
influx of learners was the poor quality of education in the townships .12 SGB members, teachers, 
parents, and students each related the problems of township schools by making a reference to 
either one of the issues that include: poor structure of the school, limited resources, 
overcrowding, violence, unqualified teachers, lack of teacher motivation, teacher union strikes, 
and corporal punishment. 
12 Due to time constraints, secondary sources were used to develop a conception of the "township school." While 
the essay lacks empirical research at township schools, teacher perspectives were assessed in combination with 
commuting learners ' impressions of their local schools. 
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Teachers who commented on the quality of township schools often lacked first-hand 
accounts, but managed to construct an image of schooling based on second hand experiences 
from educator colleagues. In a discussion on transportation issues, one Durban Academy teacher 
described why he believed learners' exited from township schools: 
You know, but a lot of people will argue, ' Why don ' t you go to schools closer to your own 
neighborhood?' But you find that a lot of those schools aren't functioning at the level that they should 
be functioning. So you find a parent is looking for a school where they know their child will be taught 
proper. 
A majority of the respondents ' explanations for township exit resonated with the above-
mentioned statement. One Durban Academy teacher remarked that learners commute to the 
Bluff simply because at township schools, "nothing happens there." The parent' s observation 
echoes Tikley and Mabogoane's description of township schools and the 'choice' these parents 
have: 
"For many black communities living in black areas, ' choice ' of school has been severely limited (to 
the point of becoming almost meaningless) by overcrowding and by a shortage of accessible schools. 
[ ... ] It is these glaring inadequacies of the historically black system that have made historically white 
schools the only meaningful choice open to many black parents despite the long distances and rising 
transportation costs often involved." 13 
Based on Tikley and Mabogoane's assessment of township schools, Durban Academy is not a 
unique case, but a school reflective of the greater learner migration occurring throughout South 
Africa. 
·Returning to the case study data, parent and student motivations were again limited by 
the ability to meet and interact with these communities due to informed consent form limitations 
and the inability to establish meetings or interviews with these parents. 14 To substitute for the 
gap in data, teacher perspectives were used based on an assumption that teachers have insight 
into their students' lives that extended beyond the academic setting. For instance, one teacher 
described learner decisions to exit by recalling an encounter he had with a township learner: 
13 Tikley and Mabogoane, 167. 
14 While principal van Rooijen located potential student respondents, time limitations convinced me that I would not 
be able to gain a reasonable cross-section of the students. In weeks two and three, I decided instead to focus on 
teacher interviews while administering student surveys to batting classes (free periods in teacher absences). Survey 
limitations developed as a result of unclear explanations of the variables I was testing. A revised survey was 
construction to avoid the problem. 
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They are in a sense running away from the schools nearby their homes. l call it 'runaway' because 
they know that the teachers are either not there, or they do not do the work properly. I mean ... l can 
name learners who came here from other townships who said, 'Please sir, I can ' t carry on like this. 
want to do something with my life.' 
In addition to student desires to exit township schools, parent preferences played a decisive role 
in student's decision to enroll in Durban Academy. In response to a survey questionnaire 
question which asked students whether their parents' preference determined their decision to 
attend Durban Academy, 70% of the learners responded "Strongly Agree" or "Agree" with the 
statement. 15 
Assuming the student responses are an accurate representation of the factors determining 
which school they chose, it then became important to assess parent motivations in selecting 
Durban Academy as well. Interactions with the parent community revealed several variables 
behind their selection of Durban Academy: discipline, school ' s history, languages offered, cost 
of school fees , and the poor quality of local schools.16 Again, the quality of education in local 
areas was one of the primary reasons parents were willing to send their children long distances to 
public schools in the suburbs. 
Teachers' comments regarding parent motivations supplemented data from the informal 
parent interviews. Describing the mindset of township parents in selecting a school, one teacher 
stated, "They want their kids to be better. They don't want their kids to be domestics. They are 
not getting them in the black schools, so they bus them out." Similarly, another respondent 
assumed that parents immediately consider the Bluff when looking to exit township schools. She 
described the selection process from the perspective of a poor black parent: "If you are a black 
parent, you get a low wage, and you are looking for a high school. You go to Grosvenor Boys 
then to Grosvenor Girls, then to Durban Academy. And since we have the lowest school fees, 
you come here." The quality and affordability of Durban Academy explains the school ' s high 
percentage of township learners. 
But what does the selection of Durban Academy mean for commuting learners? In 
response to the open-ended survey question, which asked, "If you were headmaster of Durban 
Academy, what would you change, if anything?" students commented on solutions to their daily 
15 Survey was a random sampling survey. Data is taken from commuting learners only (which comprised of forty-
eight learners commuting from locations referenced in Figure 1.1 ). 
16 Parent responses from parents ' evening are limited by the cross-section of parents who were able to attend. The 
next section goes into greater detail regarding the way student exit has decreased parent voice. 
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transportation difficulties. One learner expressed his concerns over the wasted hours spent 
commuting and stated, "I would get a skool bus so that we don't have to use public transport an 
waste time." In addition, parents living on the Bluff often related stories of commuting learners 
waiting at the bus stop from two o'clock when school ended, until five o'clock when the bus 
fares were cheapest. While the SOB staff acknowledged the transportation difficulties, funding a 
school bus was beyond the school's budget. 
On a final note, long hours of commuting might explain the lack of student motivation. 
One teacher's comment illustrates the additional challenges a commuting learner faces: "They 
travel an hour maybe an hour and a half just to get to school. And they come here and they are 
tired. I can't blame them for that. Now they've got a full school day and they get home when it 
is almost turning dark again. There is a vicious circle and it is just going to get bigger and 
bigger." Students would describe their week-day routine, which begins at 4am and ends at 8pm. 
Homework was an afterthought for most of the learners commuting from Isipingo, KwaMashu, 
and far sections of Umlazi, where commutes could take up to two hours each way. Student exit 
thus presents practical time and educational challenges in addition to the ethical concerns 
involved. 
Commuting Learners-Explaining Low Levels of Parent Voice through Learner Exit 
While long distance commutes have placed an extra burden on township learners' social 
and academic growth, the school's distance from the township communities has hampered 
parents' exercise of voice. Although SOBs were designed to foster local democratic 
participation, since 68% of the students do not live in the surrounding Bluff community there has 
been a fragmentation of communal involvement. Distance would not be an obstacle to township 
parents had it not been for South Africa's poor transport system and the inability of poorer 
parents to find time between multiple jobs. 
Understanding low levels of parent involvement requires insight into the daily routine of 
poorer township parents. One SOB member described the low parent involvement as a result of 
parents' larger social and economic problems: "Maybe ten percent of parents might be involved, 
but even that is high. And I think it is also because they are struggling to survive." Supporting 
the SOB member's statement, one teacher described what he believed was the average working 
day of a township parent: 
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I mean if you take parents that work in Umlazi in this modern time of ours, he still has to get up at 
four o' clock in the morning and be at work by seven o'clock. So, just track the time . . . if he leaves 
at half past four or five o'clock in the evening . . . once he's finished working, he gets home at seven 
o' clock or half past seven in the evening. Who's going to come to school still [for parents' evening]? 
Where is he going to have the time for that? It is actually a very sad thing to see . . . the involvement 
of the parents. 
Student exit is thus inversely related to parents' voice. Of the sixteen parents questioned during 
parent's evening only five were from commuting locations. The overall atmosphere during 
parents' evening was one of frustration expressed from the teaching community. Conditioned to 
the low parent involvement, teachers related the common problem of parents ' evening and 
remarked, "And the parents you need to speak with are the ones that never show up." The 
problems township learners face in the classroom are aggravated by the inability of parents to 
support their children outside of the classroom. 
Low parent-involvement presents autonomy concerns as well when assessing the 
decision-making process within SGBs. Durban Academy's 2009 SGB is entirely Afrikaner, but 
not out of an exclusionary policy. Explaining his failed attempts to recruit township parents, the 
SGB chairperson stated, "We try to get the black demographics on the governing body, but it is 
just too hard. You just don' t get them ... it is difficult for them to get there unfortunately 
because our meetings are at nights and there is no public transport to the Bluff at night." 
Principal van Rooijen's assessment of township parent involvement resonated with the 
chairperson's statement: "I think the day to day living and staying alive and getting money took 
over so much of their time that they don't really get involved. So the parents are allowing people 
to make decisions for them and that' s unbelievable." The parents' autonomy is compromised in 
virtue of their inability to attend meetings and voice their opinions. Decisions are made for them 
not by them. 
As a transition to the more affluent Bluff community, it is interesting to note the student 
. 
responses to the survey question, which asked learners to rank their parents' involvement in 
school activities. According to the survey, 41 % of commuting learners argued that their parents 
were "Not Active" with school affairs. Similarly 3 7% of non-commuting respondents related the 
same level of parent non-involvement. The data suggests that distance might not be the only 
factor contributing to low levels of parent involvement. 
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Non-Commuting Learners-Want Based Explanations/or Low Parent Involvement 
For non-commuting learners then, what explains low parent involvement? Within the 
non-commuting parent community, market norms evidence themselves through want-based 
norms. SGB members explained that increasing parent participation among Bluff parents was 
equally as difficult, since parents expected some type of recompense for their participation in 
parents' meetings. 17 On one occasion, the SGB purchased food to increase parent involvement, 
which did in fact improve parent turnout. One SGB member described low parent involvement 
in terms of parents' want-based norms: 
Because of the culture we have in this country, I call it, 'I want ... I want .. . Everybody I want. 
Because the culture is what can you give me, before I give you something. Part of the challenge is to 
get this mindset to change. I mean you can't go to Pik 'N Pay and say, 'I want bread, or I want the 
money. ' It's the same thing, you have to give to get. 
Want-based norms were evidenced from both parents and the SGB members. While parents 
expect a reward in return for their participation, the SGB is unwilling to offer anything in 
exchange without the parents support. Even if the SGB had the funds to purchase rewards for 
each parents' meeting, parent involvement would only increase on the basis of market exchanges 
of want-based norms. 
Although SASA's decentralized system of educational governance was designed to 
promote local voice, we find that both township and the Bluff parents rarely participate in 
democratic forums due to exit and want-regarding norms. One SGB member explained that 
although there are 800 students at Durban Academy, roughly twenty parents show-up for parent 
meetings. Teachers and SGB members agreed that the general attitude of parents is one of no 
involvement. 
But complicating matters are teachers' response to low parent involvement. Although the 
majority of teachers preferred stronger parent involvement, a few teachers noted that low parent 
involvement made their day to day work easier. Describing the advantages of an uninvolved 
parent community, one teacher stated, "The nice thing for me is that the parents in general don't 
really interfere what happens in the school. They come in when they have a problem with the 
17 Want-based norms are used in the description of non-commuting parents' lack of involvement, but not 
exclusively. According to SGB members and teachers, township parents abide by the same culture of ' I want.' For 
clarity purposes however, since Bluff parents are not challenged (or challenged to a lesser extent) by long-distance 
commutes and multiple jobs, the discussion of want-based norms is used in the discussion of Bluff parents' 
involvement since the other market norms do not pertain to them. 
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child, but generally they accept what you are doing." As in the autonomy concerns arising from 
low parent involvement in SGB affairs, a similar autonomy compromising affect stems from low 
parent involvement with the teaching community. What is troubling here is the teacher's 
acknowledgment and even preference for low parent involvement. Again, despite the 
decentralization's aim of providing parents a voice in the running of schools, decisions are made 
for parents, not by them. 
Egoism, Exit, and Parent Socialization-Concerns over Market Norms in Bluff Community 
Beyond want-based explanations for low parent involvement, Bluff parents active in 
school affairs were similarly governed by market norms. Egoism and exit were the most 
common methods of market practices in parents' approaches to education. Regarding egoism, 
one parent described her involvement narrowly in terms of her child's development: "I don't do 
it for myself. I do it for my child's education." Though the parent downplayed her personal 
egoism, valuing education solely for her child's benefit reveals the egoistic tendencies of the 
market. Corresponding with Ranson's assessment of the individualism of the markets, one 
parent remarked, "The motto I tell my child is: just remember, if you don't do it for yourself 
nobody else is going to do it for you." The market's promotion of competitive values fuels 
egoistic norms in parents' approach to education. Cooperation and fraternal relations are 
undermined by parents' narrow concerns for their own children. 
As in the case of township parents, Bluff parents extended their egoistic understanding of 
education by considering the practice of exit. During parents' evening, one parent admitted to 
his intentions of pulling his son out of Durban Academy and sending him to a private school or 
the Afrikaans school, Port Natal. Describing his approach to education reform, he remarked, "I 
am not going to be a Bluff patriot." The respondent explained that he was not going to send his 
child to one of the public schools on the Bluff simply because he was a resident there. He 
expressed a feeling of powerlessness and inability to affect change, arguing that he was only one 
man and was unable to improve the quality of the school. Again, the data identifies the way 
market norms interact with each other, forming more complex issues. Here egoism becomes 
entangled with parent motivations of exit. Another parent accompanying a friend at parents' 
evening admitted to sending her daughter to Grosvenor Girls even though she lived across the 
street from Durban Academy. 
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As a final comment on Bluff parents' exercise of market norms, Bluff parents' practice of 
exit gives rise to legitimate concerns regarding reconciliation in post-apartheid South Africa. 
One of Anderson's primary concerns with markets in education is the relationship between the 
"freedom of parents" and the "autonomy of children." 18 While SASA and its stipulation of 
school fees increase parent choice, it reduces learners' autonomy. Instead of education teaching 
learners to exercise their own judgment, schools become centers for parents to indoctrinate their 
children with their own ideals. Since, according to the student survey, students strongly agreed 
that their parents' preference determines which school they attend, parents are able to determine 
the types of values and knowledge they want transmitted to their child through the practice of 
exit. One teacher described the process of white flight from township schools in the suburbs by 
referencing parent preference for schools with a particular ethos: 
Now you bus these people in and the school now becomes a poor inner town school. So suddenly the 
whole school's ethos changes. The white parents of the kids in that school now, who can afford it, 
take their kids out and they send them off to another school where there is an ethos that they want for 
their children. 
While a parent may opt out of a poorer school simply to provide a higher standard of education 
for their child, in the post apartheid context, more extreme cases are common in which parents 
exercise exit in order to indoctrinate their children with particular values. 
Even though Pampallis observes that school fees have prevented a white flight from 
public schools, the 5% statistic of private school enrollees does not account for-learner migration 
within the public school system. 19 The varying types and quality of schools within South 
Africa's public education system allows for parents to select schools that reflect their own value 
systems. In the case of Durban Academy, Bluff parents often mentioned Port Natal, an 
Afrikaner school in Pinetown, as one of their ideal-options. 
As noted in the section on Durban Academy, Port Natal was one of the schools that 
Durban Academy considered amalgamating with during the 1997 transition period. While the 
quality of education and athletics remains strong at Port Natal, teachers and SOB members at 
Durban Academy expressed their concerns over the types of knowledge that was being taught at 
the Afrikaans-only school. One SOB member explained his concerns by describing the types of 
learners who matriculate from Port Natal: 
18 Anderson, 163. 
19 Pampallis, "School Fees," 14. 
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But the kids that are coming out of that .. . where are they going to go? The environment they are 
growing up in is not healthy. The kids' minds get indoctrinated with one side of the story. ln that way 
I am so glad that the school went this direction. And like I said in the beginning when the people go 
out to the workplace or to the university or into some real situation, he can concentrate what he really 
needs to concentrate on and not these other issues. 
Considering South Africa's apartheid past, the market encourages a repeated cycle of racial and 
economic segregation and normalizes parents exercise of exit strategies. Anderson offers a final 
assessment of the relationship between parents' freedom and children's autonomy by observing, 
"Parental rights to freedom of educational choice do not extend to holding their children in 
perpetual subjection to their own ideals."20 We have to ask whether South Africa's education 
market respects the autonomy of children in terms of their own moral development and growth 
in post-apartheid society. 
Recap of Parent/Student Community 
In the education market, children recognize the power of money at a young age. 
Stratifying access to education according to wealth subverts Anderson's notion of fraternal 
relations as, "a valuation of participants as equals engaged in a common cooperative project."2 1 
When markets determine issues of school access and quality, learners are separated by economic 
status, which limits their ability to associate with peers of different social and economic 
backgrounds. As a result, markets in education eliminate the ability for learners to experience 
and realize the meaning of fraternal and democratic values. 
Moreover, the initial assessment of SGBs as need-regarding institutions must be 
reconsidered in light of our examination of learner exit. Since Anderson defines the want-
regarding norm as, "desires backed by the ability to pay," we see how the SGB satisfies the 
wants of 'better-off township learners. Motala's (2007) observation on the internal 
differentiation within poor township and rural communities clarifies this relationship: "Evidence 
is also provided of internal differentiation within the poor, with 'winners ' and ' losers ' being 
apparent."22 The exiting 'winners,' are those learners whose 'ability to pay' allows them to 
attend former white schools in the suburbs. Market values teach them the acceptability of 
20 Anderson, 163. 
2 1 Ibid., 158. 
22 Shireen Motala, "Finance Equity Reforms in Public Schooling: A Gauteng Case Study," Democracy, Human 
Rights and Social Justice in Education (B loemfontein: Center for Education Policy Development, 2007): 33. 
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"running away." For township learners unable to afford exit, the freedom to value education as a 
shared good is undermined by a strong desire to exit. From the perspective of these ' losers,' 
one's future success is understood as a matter of attaining enough money to exit and join the 
winners in life beyond the townships and rural areas . Since, as Ranson suggests, the problems of 
our time cannot be solved in isolation, how can we expect our future leaders to engage in 
collective problem solving and address the needs of post-apartheid South Africa if they grow and 
mature in an environment governed by individualistic market norms? An acceptance of the 
education market thus equates to an acceptance of the contemporary social ills present 
throughout South Africa, since we are making no meaningful effort to prepare our future leaders 
and encourage values of civic responsibility. 
Finally, we can return again to Hirschman's analysis of exit and voice. In describing the 
relationship between exit and voice, Hirschman observes, "The decision whether to exit will 
often be taken in the light of the prospects for the effective use of voice."23 Hirschman' s 
observation applies to the education market. Parents exiting township schools may opt to leave 
township schools not solely because of the poor conditions, but as a result of their inability to 
articulate and muster any change through the SGBs. But the relationship between exit and voice 
is cyclical, as Hirschman observes, "The presence of the exit alternative can therefore tend to 
atrophy the development of the art of voice."24 As more township parents continue to leave, 
SGBs in poorer communities continue to disintegrate into meaningless formalities. 
Moreover, Hirschman' s discussion on exit and voice as in relation to public goods is 
especially pertinent to our analysis of South Africa's education market. Hirschman argues that 
in cases of public goods, citizens feel an obligation to stay even as deterioration in the 'product' 
increases. 25 In other words, since public goods benefit all members of society, one is less 
inclined to exit and more likely to exercise voice, since the good at hand is of benefit to all in 
society. Hirschman describes the relationship between deteriorating public goods and exit 
succinctly: "the worse it gets the less I can afford to leave."26 Here, Hirschman introduces a 
third concept, loyalty. According to Hirschman, loyalty is an exit-neutralizing concept that locks 
23 Hirschman, 37. 
24 Ibid., 43. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ib id., I 03 . Hirschman uses the useful analogy, "Right or wrong my country" (104). The individual sees the 
dec line of the nation-state as a publ ic good that requires hi s loyalty and service. 
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members into their firms or organizations.27 It imposes a social cost on would-be exiters, whose 
actions are considered as reflections of defection, desertion, or even treason.28 Thus, Hirschman 
observes, "As a rule, then, loyalty holds exit at bay and activates voice."29 
In terms of the parents and students and Durban Academy, the education market has 
undermined both their natural tendency to exercise voice in terms of public goods and the 
feelings of loyalty one has to his/her community. By weakening the role of the community, the 
market diminishes the social costs of exiting. Exiting is the norm, rather than the exception. The 
market alters Hirschrnan' s understanding of voice in public goods that is more accurately 
described in the phrase : "the worse it gets the more I can afford to leave." The individualism of 
the markets precludes the exercise of voice and diminishes feelings of loyalty as well. 
In retrospect, for parents operating within the education market, the freedom to value 
education according to the democratic ideals of People ' s Education is reduced to a competitive 
and egoistic approach in the selection of schools. What was once a collective struggle for "Equal 
education for all," has been transformed by market values into a society governed by 
individualistic norms. Parents prioritize educational opportunities for their own child with little 
consideration of the well-being of other learners. 
27 Ibid., 82. 
28 Ibid., 98. 
29 Ibid., 78 . 
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6. South African Educational Decentralization in Context 
Figure 6.1 
Recap of Market Norms Evidenced at Durban Academy 
School as Educational-Producer 
Market Norms C. Parents & Students as 
Education Consumers 
A. SGB 8 . Teachers 
I. Impersonal Yes 
2. Egoistic Yes 
3. Exclusive No 
4. Want-based Yes 
5. Exit > Voice Yes 
6. Is community 
"comprehensively 
governed" by market Yes 
norms? 
(Figure 6.1 corresponds with Figure 4.1 on pp. 3 8) 
School Governing Body: 
A I : Blacklisting- old school funds and maintaining "the cycle." 
A2 : The offer system- prioritizing schools funds over parent concerns. 
A3: Inclusive admission policy (contrast with Glenwood, DHS). 
No 
No 
-
No 
No 
A4 : Differentiation among the poor, 'winners' and ' losers' in virtue of students' ability to pay. 
AS: SGB platform for voice, but practical inaccessibility challenges facing township parents. 
Teachers: 
BI : The desire for personal relations . 
82: Unwillingness to raise school fees and ability to cope with changes. 
84: Recognizing learners' challenges and assuming multiple teacher roles. 
85 : Opting to stay and to grapple with evolving ethos at Durban Academy 
Parents I Students : 
C2 : Individual perspective and focus on their own child. 
C4: Culture of want and the economic approach to education. 
CS : Commuters exit township schools and non-commuters decline of Bluff patriotism. 
-
Yes 
-
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
The introduction of school fees has created a market for public education in which SGBs 
have become local debt-collecting organs feared by the non-fee paying community. Since 
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educational decentralization relies heavily on the use of market mechanisms, a reevaluation of 
the fiscal decentralization attached to educational decentralization must be reconsidered. Based 
on the multiple avenues through which students acquire knowledge, South Africa's local 
education market holds concerning implications for the future and sustainability of democracy. 
This final section looks to achieve three goals: first, to identify the limitations of the case study 
and define a relative scope of the observations drawn; second, to reflect on the aims of People ' s 
Education and offer a way forward; and third, to present a brief comparative assessment of 
education markets in other countries. 
Limitations 
The merits of the case study are subject to several criticisms. One of the primary 
limitations of the study is that it assumes market norms only operate in the presence of market 
institutions. The norms of exclusion, self-interest, or exit may exist prior to the introduction of 
market mechanisms and may be an aspect of school institutional settings in general. The very 
nature of education, as a good highly valued by society, supports this interpretation. Since 
education defines the social hierarchy and determines a child' s future opportunities, parents are 
likely to be interested in their child's own education. This observation suggests that both egoism 
and the want-regarding norms are a fact of education and may not require the influence of market 
norms. Moreover, especially in the South African context where wealthy communities sought 
the exclusion of black learners to preserve their schools' culture and ethos, practices of exclusion 
may not require the introduction of the market. It can be argued then that school fees are not the 
issue, but underlying racial tensions that are cloaked behind the race-neutral, ability-to-pay 
criteria. But an immediate response to this critique is that while market norms may have existed 
prior to the introduction of the market, the local market for education has exacerbated these 
individualistic norms. If anything, parents' egoism in their child's education and/or their cultural 
motivations to exclude are complicated by these financial incentives. Moreover, this case study 
offers compelling evidence of financially exclusive policies (i.e. blacklisting and the offer 
system) even in the presence of a racially inclusive admissions policy. 
Another potential criticism concerns the presence of social norms in the teaching 
community. It may not be the case that the absence of market responsibilities explains teachers ' 
social norms, but that the profession requires and attracts individuals with certain characteristics 
or attributes. There may be something internal to the teaching profession that explains their 
desire to include disadvantaged learners and to address student needs. But once again, even if 
we acknowledge the valid~ty of this criticism, the fact that teachers were not burdened by 
financial decisions allowed for them to exercise the social norms their profession requires. 
Unlike the SOB members who lamented the demands of running a "tight ship," teachers were 
allowed to value education in a way they saw fit. 1 
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Another limitation concerns the section on learner exit. Certainly, a degree of inter-
district transport is required to desegregate schools in post-apartheid South Africa, as was and 
still is the U.S. experience in the aftermath of slavery and segregation. While this essay does not 
deny present social realities in South Africa, it emphasizes the norms guiding the transport of 
students between districts. What the education market adds to the notion of learner migration is 
the acceptability ofleaving one's poor local school and framing learner commutes as a matter of 
wealth. Of added importance is the way the market limits the ability for parents and learners 
seeking an integrated education to select a different school for non-economic reasons. For 
instance, township parents who value an integrated education may be viewed as self-serving 
wealthy parents who do not care about their local community. The same logic applies to 
wealthier Bluff parents, who in the process of sending their children to a private school, may be 
perceived by the community as want-regarding, egoistic parents. 
Recalling People's Education 
Returning to the original goals of the People's Education movement, we see how the 
introduction of school fees has undermined these education ideals. Let us recall Soobrayan's 
assessment of the movement's core values: "It must be aimed at overcoming negative social 
values such as elitism, individualism, authoritarianism and competitiveness-and in their place 
instill democratic values, collectivism, and a wider social consciousness."2 While the movement 
succeeded in establishing platforms for parent and student voice, the attachment of financial 
responsibilities to SGBs has undermined genuine efforts to include parent and student concerns. 
The "fear of victimization" from a central authority is replaced by a "fear of debt collectors" at 
1 But again, teachers' freedom to value education according to social norms extended only insofar as their classroom 
walls, i.e. overall school operations are decided by SGBs and the market incentives that drive it. 
2 Soobrayan, 33 . 
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the local level. As a result of school fee policy, voice for the majority of parents is exercised to 
such a limited extent to be considered meaningless. 
Based on the case study of Durban Academy, the answer to Anderson's final step is 
apparent: state regulation of the education market is permitted. Anderson explains why the goals 
of education can only be realized through non-market mechanisms: 
Some goods can be secured only through a form of democratic provision that is nonexclusive, 
principle-and need-regarding, and regulated primarily through voice. To attempt to provide these 
goods through market mechanisms is to undermine our capacity to value and realize ourselves as 
fraternal democratic citizens.3 
Democracy, not markets, is best ·suited for parents and learners to realize themselves as 
democratic citizens. Democratic provisioning of education secures collective community based 
deliberations and fraternal values necessary to achieve the ends of education. Hence, the way 
forward may require a reassessment of the past and reflecting on the original goals of People's 
Education may be a worthy place to start the restructuring process. 
International Perspective on Educational Decentralization 
Despite the shortcomings of educational decentralization, central governments have been 
reluctant to recentralize policy. In addition to the political and financial burdens of assuming 
responsibility for education, one of the primary hurdles to recentralization has come from 
international organizations like the IMF and the World Bank. Bray's (2008) World Bank Report 
on community financing for education is guided in part by the assumption: "People who pay 
directly for services are likely to take a stronger interest in them than are people who receive 
services free of charge."4 Indeed, while educational decentralization has had its success in select 
nations (e.g. India and Singapore), the general trend has been one of state failure to provide 
quality schooling. 
To Bray's credit however, he does acknowledge the failures of educational 
decentralization in other developing countries. For instance, Bray notes the burden of 
community financing for education placed on Uganda, where in the aftermath of an education 
collapse in the 1970s, communities were required to meet 65 to 90 percent of total costs for 
3 Anderson, 159. 
4 Mark Bray, "Decentralization of Education- Community Financing," (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1996), 
v. 
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public schooling. Similarly, Togo experienced an education crisis in the mid-1980s and 
community financing amounted to nearly two-thirds of the resources required to operate public 
sector schools. In the early 1990s, local communities in Chad, Malawi, Zimbabwe, and Kenya 
were similarly dealt new financial responsibilities for education. 5 As in the South African case, 
these nations have relied on the use of school fees, which in tum, has amounted to the same 
divisive effects. In Zimbabwe, one school official remarked, "In short, management committees 
were concerned with maintaining former colonial privileges and standards."6 In Kenya, . parents 
felt exploited by management committees (SGB equivalents) who they claimed were 
"demanding and unsympathetic to the burdens they impose." 7 
Despite the universal impact of school fees on local communities, the international push 
for educational decentralization has not haltered. Wekwete references the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers and the international emphasis on "shrinking government."8 Similarly, Bardhan 
describes with much more force that "Decentralization is the rage," and that it is sometimes used 
as "a synonym for privatization."9 The link between markets for education and the demise of 
local autonomy and democracy must be brought to the forefront in order to temper the blind push 
for educational decentralization. Offering a final recommendation to address failing education 
policies in developing nations, Geo-Jaja observes, "Decentralization strategy cannot be 
implemented in development without crucial central-government budgetary support to 
education." 10 If we are intent on ensuring long-term sustainability of democratic initiatives, we 
must consider the merits of a more central provision of education. 
Recentralizing Education Policy in South Africa 
South Africa has recognized the inefficacy of a decentralized education market and has 
attempted to recentralize education policy. 11 In 2007, South Africa adopted a policy of no-fee 
5 Bray, 3. 
6 Ibid., 17. 
7 Ibid., 18. 
8 Wekwete, 247. 
9 Bardhan, 185. 
10 Geo-Jaja, "Decentralisation and Privatisation," 312. 
11 Decentralization reflects the challenge of unfunded mandates: that is, devolving financial responsibilities without 
central assistance, while holding local public schools accountable to national standards. While decentralization is 
not necessarily synonymous with privatization, local governments increasingly rely on user fees to fund social 
services. In this same vein, a solution to the decentralized education market need not require a recentralization of 
education policy. Perhaps there is a solution to the market effects that can be remedied through increased central 
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schools. Looking to uphold a child's constitutional right to education, the government removed 
school fees for the lowest 40% of schools. In 2008, the government extended no-fee schools to 
include Quintile 3 schools as well, making public education free for the poorest 60% of 
schools. 12 In addition, the government looks to compensate 10% of non-fee paying learners in 
Quintile 4 and 5 schools. 
But to place matters in perspective, Durban Academy is a Quintile 4 school untouched by 
the no-fee school policy. Limiting a market for education to richer schools still impacts the 
values richer and poorer students learn to endorse. In a partially regulated education market, 
exiting 'winners' still learn the acceptability of running away, while 'losers' compete for 
entrance into the winning, richer schools. Confining the market to Quintile 4 and 5 schools does 
little to address the ethical limitations of South Africa's education market. Supporting this 
observation is the Ministry of Education's recent initiative called, "Policy on Learner Transport." 
While the legislation looks to provide equal learner transport across the nine provinces, it 
perpetuates the use of market norms of exit. Especially in catchment areas including a mix of 
no-fee schools and Quintile 4 or 5 schools, it is likely that students will compete for entrance into 
higher quality schools. This practice of exit threatens community solidarity and the realization 
of democratic principles. 
Finally, while the government recognizes the limited capacity of SGBs, little has been 
done to address this difficulty. The 2008 country report by Education for All states, "Findings of 
the Ministerial review on School Governance indicate that, while the vast majority of schools (98 
percent) have SGBs, established in accordance with legal requirements, many experience 
problems in sustaining active participation in SGBs."13 While the report cites lack of time, 
literacy, costs, and other competency related issues, school fee responsibilities and SOB-parent 
interactions should also be considered as an explanation for limited participation. The 
government must recognize these ethical limitations of even partially regulated education 
markets if it seeks an effective system of decentralized education. 
provisioning within a decentralized structure. Yet again, this proposal challenges our understanding of politics, for 
which politician would willingly supply capital for local programs that he/she will not be accredited for? 
12 Education for All, "Country Report: South Africa," Department of Education Republic of South Africa (2008): 38. 
13 Ibid. , 46. 
73 
7. Conclusion 
The international trend in educational decentralization asks us to return to the basic 
question: education for what purpose? 14 This essay challenges the decentralization of education 
by emphasizing the central importance of education in sustaining and enhancing democratic life. 
If this essay can offer one suggestion to inform the educational decentralization debate, it should 
be this: that if we are intent on securing the ends of education-to cultivate the democratic norms 
and civic responsibility required to sustain democratic practices-the provision of education 
cannot be meted out by the market and may require democratic processes in the delivery of 
education. Further studies should focus on the merits of a democratic provisioning of education 
and whether a non-market provisioning is possible in a decentralized system. Although this 
essay does not offer much comment on the merits of a more centralized financing of education, it 
has demonstrated the very important and concerning implications arising from a market 
distribution of education. 
By addressing the ethical limitations of educational decentralization, I attempt to add an 
important and often under-studied area of concern to policymakers' cost-benefit analysis of 
education policy. It seems logical, that if our own moral views and perspectives on society guide 
our actions, an assessment of these normative ideals can help to clarify the principle causes 
behind failing democratic institutions. In retrospect, this essay stresses the important role of the 
state in ensuring the equitable provisioning of public schooling and suggests that while education 
can establish the conditions required for democracy, the market for education severely inhibits 
the realization of this end. 
14 E.L. Boyer, College: The undergraduate experience in America. (New York: HarperCollins, 1987), 283; in Anne 
Colby, Thomas Ehrlich, Elizabeth Beaumont, and Jason Stephens, Educating Citizens. (San Francisco: The 
Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 2003), 6. 
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